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THE MIND OF A LIBERAL LAW PROFESSOR:
SELECTIONS FROM THE WRITINGS OF LOUIS B.
SCHWARTZ
I.

ON LAW REFORM

Why Penal Law Reform?'
The need for recurrent and systematic reconsideration of the penal
law . . . is not so much because reform is likely to reduce the crime
rate or flatten the current "crime wave", but so that we, the punishers,
can believe that we are rendering justice as well as we can and that our
system is worthy of our own respect.
Cydes of Reform: Existential Commitment Rather than Cynicism'
Anyone who has observed the cycle of penological reform may be
forgiven a radical skepticism. Rehabilitation replaces retribution as the
dominant goal of penal systems. Retribution makes a comeback. Sentencing discretion vested solely in judges gives way to vast discretion for
parole boards. Flat sentences are abandoned in favor of indeterminate
sentences, to be followed by a return to flat sentences subject to discounts for "good time" and to executive commutation of sentences. The
philosophy of the juvenile court, based on assumptions of the benign
purposes and onnicompetence of the state, gains sway over the neighboring territory of the "youthful offender," after which comes renewed
faith in "adult" criminal procedure designed to protect against state
tyranny. There is justification for skepticism about "expertise" and
"science" in such matters, or at least for building into our theories the
concept that modern economists call "bounded rationality," an overriding awareness that we know too little, and cannot know enough, to
govern with confidence. Pessimism seems warranted as every reform
seems to become the next generation's abuse. There are morals to be
drawn from this perplexing history. The noble urge to improve must be
tempered by a lively awareness that "progress" and "regress" are easily
confused. Our movements must be tentative and heuristic, not dogmatic.
This is not the counsel of despair. Immobility and stagnation are not
I Schwartz, Reform of the Criminal Law in the United States: Contemporary Issues, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTIcE (1983).
2 Schwartz, Options in Constructing a Sentencing System, 67 VA. L. REV. 637, 691-92
(1981) (footnote omitted).
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acceptable alternatives. Reformers must reform. They had best do so,
not because of any illusion that Satan can be finally laid by the heels,
but because of an existential commitment to wrestle against him.
The perpetual process of reform should benefit if emphasis shifts
somewhat away from the search for the "right" goal or combination of
ultimate goals of a penal system. It is more fruitful to confront the
problems of institutional structure, of administrative law, of allocation
of power and checks on power, and of criteria for the exercise of
discretion.
Purposes of the Penal Law'
On wire tapping, as on most problems of the penal law, where one
comes out depends largely on the attitudes and assumptions which one
brings to the controversy. At one extreme, one may believe that social
order depends almost entirely on punishment of as many culprits as
possible. At the other extreme is the view that all criminal law is simply crudely disguised vengeance, that jail and capital punishment are
pointless cruelties deterring no one, embittering more criminals than
they reform, and inflicting less pain on the guilty than on their innocent dependents. Between these two extremes is a third position that
may commend itself to moderates. This position accepts the hypothesis
of deterrence by example, but not the proposition that the best penal
system is the one that produces convictions and sentences in 100% of
the cases of crime. The paradoxical fact is that arrest, conviction, and
punishment of every criminal would be a catastrophe. Hardly one of us
would escape, for we have all at one time or another committed acts
that the law regards as serious offenses. Kinsey has tabulated our extensive sexual misdeeds. The Bureau of Internal Revenue is the great
archive of our false swearing and cheating. The highway death statistics inadequately record our predilection for manslaughter. One hundred percent law enforcement would not leave enough people at large
to build and man the prisons in which the rest of us would reside.
Somehow we manage to conduct a fairly orderly, stable society although arrests are made in a small percentage of the offenses committed, and convictions lag very far behind arrests.
A penal system gives us about all we can get out of it if apprehension and punishment are pursued and inflicted with sufficient determination that a would-be law violator must count them as substantial
risks. The escape of an occasional or even many guilty individuals, be3 Schwartz, On Current Proposals to Legalize Wire Tapping, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 157, 15758 (1954).
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cause of the procedural safeguards that we accord to the accused, is
therefore a tolerable price to pay for the preservation of an atmosphere
of freedom and respect for individuality. Anglo-American societies have
willingly paid this price for many centuries. Consider the number and
variety of escape hatches for criminals built into our traditional and
constitutional structure: the rule against searching a suspect or his
house or his papers except on reasonable grounds previously exhibited
to a judge; the requirement that prosecution witnesses tell their story in
court, in the presence of the accused; the necessity that accomplice testimony be corroborated; the privilege against self-incrmination; the right
to prevent one's spouse or lawyer from testifying to the crimes one has
admitted in confidence; the constitutional necessity to produce two witnesses to an overt act of treason; the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt; the right to trial by jury with the concomitant opportunity of the defendant to avoid punishment if a single juror, however
obtuse, remains unpersuaded.
One stands amazed at these products of 1000 years of AngloAmerican experience in restraining law enforcement. Make no mistake
about it. These are not rules for the protection of the innocent alone.
They are rules which operate and were intended to operate before anyone could decide whether the suspect was innocent or guilty. They are
rules which are availed of in the vast majority of cases by persons more
likely guilty than not. Their peculiar usefulness to the "guilty" is no
accident, for many of these rules were written into the Constitution by
real "criminals," fresh from experience as smugglers, tax evaders, seditionists and traitors to the regime of George III. Theirs was no mawkish sentimentality for miscreants. They understood, as we must understand, that the law enforcment net cannot be tightened for the guilty
without enmeshing the innocent; that decent law enforcement is possible without impairing the bulwarks against injustice and tyranny; and
that the worth of a society will eventually be reckoned not in proportion to the number of criminals it crucifies, burns, hangs or imprisons,
but rather by the degree of liberty experienced by the great body of its
citizenry. There have never been more determined law enforcers than
Nazi Germany or the Soviet.
How Social Statistics Interact with Criminal Law4
The thesis is that the sex laws are absurd because they subject
almost the entire population to corrective measures. Commentators
4 Schwartz, Book Review, 96 U. PA. L. REV. 914, 914-17 (1948) (reviewing A. KINSEY,
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948)) (footnotes omitted).
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have commended Professor Kinsey and his colleagues for showing "how
unrealistic and even barbarous is the legalistic conception of sex relations." These laws, thus characterized as absurd in their total effect,
are also challenged as class legislation, foisting the sex taboos of the
upper social levels, e.g., intolerance of premarital intercourse .

,

on

the rest of the population.
In reading his data in favor of more understanding and less shock
on the part of social workers, educators, military and legal authorities
who encounter divergent sex practices, Kinsey is on firmer ground than
when he suggests that the sex laws be repealed because so many men
violate them. If the conduct proscribed by these laws is undesirable,
evidence of promiscuous violation would, with greater logic, support an
increase in penalties and more rigorous enforcement. The test of a
criminal law is not its correlation with actual behavior, but its correspondence to behavior ideals and its efficiency in promoting those
ideals. The report itself demonstrates that people who engage in forbidden practices nevertheless subscribe to the law and morality which condemn their conduct. This is not hyposcrisy, although hypocritical people may take such positions. This is only a recognition that there may
be a better way of life than one is personally able to follow in every
situation.
Do the sodomy laws, then, embody desirable standards of conduct?
A very large proportion of our population will respond with an unhesitating affirmative, however irrational and superstitious this article of
faith may seem to the anthropologist. Kinsey disclaims the desire or
power to make moral evaluations and therefore must accept this popular hypothesis in evaluating the law. If we accept the hypothesis that
sexual "perversion" is undesirable, the next question is whether the
criminal law can effectively prevent it. The statistics seem to show that
threat of imprisonment does not deter vast numbers of men from at
least experimenting in heterodox sexuality. But it is important to bear
in mind that the percentages stated in the quotation are cumulative
incidence figures, i.e., they denote the proportion of the male population which has ever had any of the named experiences. They do not
represent proportions of the population currently engaged in forbidden
sexual activity. A "cumulative incidence" of 95 per cent obviously includes a great majority whose sexual life exhibits fairly close conformity to the legal norm, despite occasional divagations. Overt homosexuality is an isolated or transitory experience in the lives of a very large
proportion of the 37 per cent who have had it. Even in the age of
greatest frequency of sexuality with animals-between adolescence and
20 years-only one per cent of total sexual outlet takes this form. . ..
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If the effectiveness of criminal laws is to be tested by conformity and
non-conformity, one would have to say there was more evidence here of
success than of failure.
Even if it be assumed that the sex laws exert some influence in
favor of desirable conduct, these laws could be justifiably criticized if
they disserve other important objectives. If, for example, the effective
deterrence of sexual non-conformity required the five per cent who are
pure to support the rest of us in penal institutions, the pure would be
the first to urge repeal. But that suggestion is nonsense. As well attack
the criminal law in its entirety on the ground that the cumulative incidence of violations would put, not 95 per cent, but everyone of us in
jail. At the technical level, the statute of limitations would save most;
and premarital intercourse, the most frequent violation, is usually punishable only by a small fine. Beyond this is the reality of life, that the
criminal law is never more than fractionally enforced, and should not
be in view of the ridiculously inconvenient consequences of 100 per cent
enforcement. The criminal law serves its purpose by threatening punishment rather than by actual incarceration, except in the relatively few
cases where incapacitation is the dominant purpose of the sentence.
The actuality of imprisonment is an unfortunate incident to the necessity of maintaining the threat. Considering the frequency of sex violations there are extraordinarily few persons in jail on this account.
There are of course evils that can flow from the existence of unenforced or whimsically enforced laws. Statutes which are generally
honored in the breach lend themselves to blackmail and political persecution if someone unexpectedly chooses to take them seriously. A cynical attitude towards law enforcement in general may result from the
presence of such laws. This danger, however, is gravest when violations
are more or less public, as is often the case under liquor and gambling
restraints. We are made uncomfortable by the glaring inconsistency between our ideals and our deeds. Sex crimes-especially those which are
infrequently prosecuted-are for the most part secret. It is one of the
paradoxes of social processes that Dr. Kinsey's revelations therefore
may generate the very cynicism regarding law which might not have
followed from the undocumented and unpublicized fact that our sex
lives do not conform to our moral professions.
Now that Kinsey has let the cat out of the bag, shall we see major
modifications of the sex laws comparable to the repeal of prohibition? I
think not. Prohibition went out not merely because violation was frequent, but because of increasing doubts that the forbidden conduct was
undesirable and much evidence that the cost and consequence of enforcement were intolerable. The situation of the sex laws is much more
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comparable to the perjury problem. If cumulative incidence figures
were compiled on conscious sworn fabrications in court proceedings, tax
returns, etc., they would no doubt lend apparent support to the proposition that the perjury laws were "unrealistic" and "barbarous" contradictions of "normal" human behavior. But not a voice would be raised
for repeal, because we would all go on believing that perjury was an
evil and the threat of punishment plus the subtle influence of penal
sanctions on the general moral climate of the community do tend to
restrain it to some extent. Accordingly, Kinsey has not disproved the
basic postulates of the sex laws: that the forbidden conduct is undesirable, that it can be deterred, and that the social cost of the deterrence
program is not excessive.
It is on morals rather than on criminal law that Sexual Behavior
in the Human Male must have its initial impact. Despite the authors'
anxious attempt, as good scientists, to make amoral social interpretation, their strictures against the criminal law impugn the prevailing
sexual morality. To reveal that certain behavior patterns are widespread, that they are a product of environment, opportunity, age and
other factors over which the individual has little control, that they are
not objectively harmful except as a result of society's efforts at repression . . .

,

to point out that similar behavior is encountered among

other animals than man, to suggest that the law ought not to punish
and that psychiatrists might better devote themselves to reassuring the
sexual deviate rather than attempting to "redirect behavior". . .- all
these add up to a denial that sexual "perversion" is an evil. When this
doctrine presents itself for public acceptance, it faces formidable opposition based on Holy Writ and immemorial folk-belief, precisely as did
the revision of religious beliefs implicit in Darwin's Origin of Species.
Not until this new morality triumphs, or the more distant day when
Americans cease to regard minority morals as a legitimate object of social coercion, will it be time to say that the law, which can only define
and implement generally accepted social objectives, is unrealistic and
barbarous. Meanwhile changes in practice will accrete, perhaps faster
than changes in doctrine. District attorneys in selecting cases for prosecution will make practical distinctions between commercial pandering
to bizarre sex desires and the non-conformity of one married couple to
the methods of physical gratification satisfactory to others; between homosexual relations voluntarily established among adult partners and
aggressions or seductions that turn the inexperienced into unhappy-byways of social conflict. Eventually, such distinctions ease themselves
into the written law, especially if it can be done in the course of a
general revision of the penal code. This avoids the appearance of out-
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right repudiation of conservative moral standards, by presenting the
changes in a context of merely technical improvements.
Sin and the Criminal Law 5
The argument for maintaining criminal sanctions against professional promoters of "vice" is essentially that drawing the line there retains some brake on economic exploitation of human weaknesses and
some expression of the community's reservations about the activity itself, but minimizes the intolerable side-effects of attempting to make
criminals out of millions of users of marijuana and patrons of gambling
or prostitution. It is not "illogical . . . to forbid selling what it is permissible to give away free" because the cost-benefit calculation for law
enforcement against sellers is quite different when buyers are also incriminated. Selling, in our commercial society implies promotion, advertising, bait for the unwary. A restraint on such activity does indeed
somewhat restrict access to goods and services that some customers desire. It may also raise the price through the operation of the "crime
tariff." But the customer remains free, in the sense that his personal
security is not threatened by the State. The relatively few sellers are so
threatened, but the constraint upon them is not an attempt to govern
their life styles or sensual satisfactions; it is instead a relatively conventional regulation of economic activity. The ways in which one can make
a living in our society are restricted by legislation ranging from licensing statutes to anti-begging ordinances. Even if one were prepared to
recognize the "right to be sick" so far as to legalize possession, use, and
non-commercial transfers of opiates, would it be arbitrary for Congress
to ban importation and wholesale distribution of narcotics?
Abortion: PartialDecriminalizationRecommended'
The criminal law in this area cannot undertake or pretend to draw
the line where religion or morals would draw it. Moral demands on
human behavior can be higher than those of the criminal law precisely
because violations of those higher standards do not carry the grave consequence of penal offenses. Moreover, moral standards in this area are
in a state of flux, with wide disagreement among honest and responsible people. The range of opinion among reasonable men runs from
deep religious conviction that any destruction of incipient human life,
" Schwartz, Book Review, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 528, 531 (1971) (reviewing H. PARKER, THE
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968)) (footnotes omitted).
* MODEL PENAL CODE 150-51 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) (Schwartz proposal).

854

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 131:847

even to save the life of the mother, is murder, to the equally fervent
belief that the failure to limit procreation is itself unconscionable and
immoral if offspring are destined to be idiots, or bastards, or undernourished, mal-educated rebels against society. For many people sexual
intercourse divorced from the end of procreation is a sin; for multitudes
of others it is one of the legitimate joys of living. Those who think in
utilitarian terms on these matters can differ among themselves as
widely as moralists. Voluntary limitation of population can be seen as
national suicide in a world-wide competition for numerical superiority,
while to others uncontrolled procreation appears equally suicidal as
tending to aggravate the pressure of population on limited natural resources and so driving nations to mutually destructive wars. To use the
criminal law against a substantial body of decent opinion, even if it be
minority opinion, is contrary to our basic traditions. Accordingly, here
as elsewhere, criminal punishment must be reserved for behavior that
falls below standards generally agreed to by substantially the entire
community.
An Agenda for Further Reforms of Penal Law
One can dream of possibilities in legislation, criminal administration and political leadership that go well beyond the range of this article. How refreshing it would be if the new President [Carter], as he
signed the criminal law reform bill, should declare:
This is not a Safe Streets Act. Criminal laws are a secondary, although essential, protection against violent crime,
and the states rather than the federal government are primarily responsible for physical security on the streets and in the
homes. Of greater significance than criminal law, in the long
run, is the confidence of all segments of the community that
our system is fair and benevolent: fair in the distribution of
income, fair in the assessment of taxes and other burdens,
benevolent in its respect for individual freedom. This new
federal criminal code promotes respect for law by its rationality, by its safeguards against discrimination and arbitrary
punishment, and by eliminating obsolete and technical obstructions to effective law enforcement. Along with other reforms, it may make a contribution to a more tranquil life in
city and countryside. We don't know that it will because,
7Schwartz, Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Issues, Tactics, Prospects,LAW & CON.

TEMP. PROBS., Winter 1977, at 1, 58-60 (footnotes omitted).
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despite prodigious efforts in universities and government, the
causes of crime are very poorly understood and "cures" for
crime virtually unknown. But if we cannot look to today's
legislation to "solve the crime problem," we shall at least
have cleared away ancient and ugly grievances against the
system.
This modest, and therefore honest, declaration might well be accompanied by a few measures that would put future reforms on a solid
footing. Among these, the highest priority might be given to establishing a credible system of criminal statistics. The existing system is a
scandal. It depends almost exclusively on crimes reported to the police
or on arrest statistics. The very categories used in reporting
crimes-larceny, robbery, burglary, fraud-embrace such a broad
range of behavior, from the trivial to the most dangerous, that reporting
in such categories reflects the nature and gravity of crime only with
intolerable margins of error. Since the overwhelming majority of crimes
are not reported to police, since the number of arrests made is largely a
function of fluctuating police policy, and since the numbers have frequently been manipulated by reporting police departments to make
themselves look better, the country is operating in a state of basic ignorance. We cannot be sure, for example, how much of the huge reported
increase in crime in recent years reflects changes in the reporting system, monetary inflation that converts formerly petty thefts into reportable felonies, or even such beneficent developments as a greater readiness
of Blacks, emerging into the mainstream of American life, to report
crimes to the police. It is time to establish a national crime census,
based on scientific sampling of the general population, to ascertain the
number of actual victimizations in a given period. Such data could be
supplemented by reports from employers, insurance companies and
other institutions, and from the armed forces, regarding those vast pools
of unreported theft and aggression on the docks, in the warehouses, in
the banks and in department stores. It is only by regarding the phenomenon of crime with unflinching concentration and acceptance of the
full truth-as if we were epidemiologists bent on wiping out smallpox
in India-that we can aspire to understanding and control.
Other promising paths of advance would include: (1) providing
further guidance for the exercise of judicial discretion in sentencing by
developing "presumptive sentences" for typical situations, along lines
recently advocated by Senators Kennedy and Hart; (2) creating in the
Department of Justice a permanent criminal justice research unit to
follow the legislative, judicial and administrative developments throughout the nation and the world, and to act as a clearinghouse for informa-
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tion and suggestions to the states; (3) experimenting with the correctional system by, for example, making disciplined labor on public
works the central experience; (4) developing some alternative to the faltering juvenile delinquency laws for removing violent young aggressives
from the environments which they terrorize; and (5) introducing into
the law of justification and excuse the concept of a margin for noncriminal error.
As Mr. Justice Brandeis said long ago, "If we would guide by the
light of reason, we must let our minds be bold."
On Intransigent Perfectionism as Obstacle to
PragmaticLaw Reform'
Senator Kennedy's Criminal Code Reform Act of 1978 (S. 1437;
H.R. 6869) recently passed the Senate by a vote of 72 to 15; but its
future in the House, where hearings are being conducted in the Committee on the Judiciary, is problematical ....
Although the opposition in the Senate was overwhelmingly right
wing (Senators Eastland, Dole, Griffin, Allen, Domenici, Bartlett, et
al.), the big threat to the prospect for reform comes from certain elements of the civil liberties establishment. In this bizarre alliance of Left
and Right to defeat reform, the self-destructive posture of the Left is
"we oppose any bill that does not include all the reforms we favor." No
effort is made to distinguish between objectionable features which the
bill merely carries forward from existing law and objectionable features
which can possibly be attributed to the Kennedy bill ....
The tone of the opposition is hysterical. [A published] ACLU
memorandum includes charges that "dangers. . . are enlarged by...
re-enactment of [certain existing provisions]." How re-enactment of existing law can enlarge dangers is not explained. Some other scary
charges are based on farfetched interpretations which "could conceivably" render some provisions oppressive. Such an approach disregards
prior experience with similar existing law, disregards normal rules of
interpretation, disregards constitutional limitations which limit the application of all laws, and above all disregards the age-old lesson that
abusive prosecutions are possible under any law (history records abusive prosecutions for treason, murder, rape, trespass, bribery, contempt
of court, etc.). All criminal law has potential for abuse, and the price of
liberty is eternal vigilance. But, as Alexander Hamilton wrote in The
Federalistof opponents to the constitutional proposal for an indepen8 226 NAnON 386, 386, 403 (1978) (letter to the editor from Louis B. Schwartz).
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dent judiciary, the guardians of liberty should not give themselves up to
"the rage for objection which disorders their imaginations and
judgements."
The issue which has fractured the liberal community in this instance is not what civil liberties are desirable-we are virtually unanimous as to that-but which are at present achievable. That is a political issue. On such an issue liberals would do well to align themselves
with that master of politics who has already performed a political miracle for civil liberties in getting S. 1437 through the Senate largely unscathed, Senator Kennedy.
ACLU and the National Committee
Against Repressive Legislation have no power to bring about the enactment of an ideal bill. They have only the power to foster doubts
among wavering or confused legislators, and thus to aid the forces of
reaction and lethargy that are aligned against the Kennedy bill, i.e.,
against any reform whatever.
The Best As Enemy of the Good9
After 10 years of effort and controversy, the moment of truth has
arrived for reform of the federal criminal code. Senator Edward Kennedy's version has been approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee
with a single dissent because of its leniency toward marijuana. Representative Robert Drinan's version has just been favorably reported by a
two-to-one vote of the House Judiciary Committee. The Drinan bill is
somewhat more favorable to civil liberties than what Kennedy was able
to achieve in the Senate, but both versions represent extraordinary advances over existing law. Inevitably, the reform project bypasses many
hot issues, such as capital punishment, gun control, espionage, entrapment, and wiretapping. On these subjects existing law would remain in
force, part of the never-exhausted agenda of law reform. But hundreds
of improvements proposed by Kennedy and Drinan go a very long way
toward promoting respect for law by making the law respectable.
What, then, stands in the way of this civil liberties reform? It is
not the opposition of right wingers in both houses. Strangely enough,
the principal obstacle is the American Civil Liberties Union. In the
early 1970s, the ACLU and other liberal groups fought valiantly to
defeat the notorious S.1, President Nixon's retrograde version of criminal law reform. But the ACLU became intoxicated by the thrill of opposition. In the years since, it has drifted into the paranoia of opposing
I

Schwartz, Civil Liberties vs. the ACLU, NEW REPUBLIC, July 26, 1980, at 20, 23.
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any provision which "could be abused," as if there were ever a criminal
law that could not be abused. It has attacked the proposed code for
provisions found in existing law, as if the code had introduced them or
as if defeat of the code would get rid of them. In general, the ACLU
has fought progress on the indefensible line that no reform, however
beneficent, is acceptable if it omits any desirable element. In a final act
of political and intellectual bankruptcy, the ACLU, following favorable
action by the House Judiciary Committee, announced its opposition to
the Drinan bill. A notable case of "the best as enemy of the good."
Those who are struggling to achieve a modern liberal federal
criminal code would do well to ponder what Benjamin' Franklin said at
the end of the debates over the federal Constitution:
[W]hen you assemble a number of men to have the advantage of their joint wisdom, you inevitably assemble with
those men, all their prejudices, their passions, their errors of
opinion, their local interests, and their selfish views. From
such an Assembly can a perfect production be expected? It
therefore astonishes me, Sir, to find this system approaching
so near to perfection as it does. . . Thus I consent, Sir, to
this Constitution because I expect no better, and because I
am not sure that it is not the best.

II.

ON INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

Defending the Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by
Illegal Police Practices "
THE American rule forbidding use of illegally obtained evidence to
secure criminal convictions has evoked reactions from British penalists
ranging from outright rejection to perplexity or gentle tolerance. It has
seemed anomalous that the criminal should go unpunished because the
policeman erred. Far better to convict the manifestly guilty murderer or
rapist and then turn one's attention to the proper measures of discipline
to be applied to the policeman. "Two wrongs don't make a right" triumphantly declare the more naive of my fellow-countrymen who deplore the rule of exclusion. I have not heard that supposedly conclusive
argument from Englishmen, but the general opinion here seems to be
that it is surely enough to give judges discretionary power to exclude
evidence when they are satisfied that it has been unfairly or oppres10 Schwartz, Excluding Evidence Illegally Obtained: American Idiosyncracy and Rational
Response to Social Conditions, 29 MOD. L. REV. 635, 635-36 (1966) (footnotes omitted).
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sively obtained. Perhaps that does go far enough in a country where it
can be said that a word of disapproval from a judge would assure a
change of practice by the police. American police are not so malleable;
they not infrequently pass adverse public judgment on the judicial decisions which restrain them, with more than a hint occasionally of an
intention to persist in methods which they regard as essential to their
success ...
The essence of the matter is that American experience has shown
thhe inefficacy of collateral disciplinary measures to secure police observance of lawful limits of their investigative procedures.

. .

. It is

hardly to be wondered at that a policeman who is the hero in Monday's
conviction of a dangerous criminal will not find himself in the prisoner's dock on Tuesday charged with criminal trespass or false imprisonment based on the tactics of his arrest of the convict. It would be his
fellow-police and his collaborator, the public prosecutor (usually an
elective office in our states), who would have to turn on him thus. Nor
are civil remedies adequate against misguided police zeal. Damages to
those most likely to be victimized by police excesses will be minimal,
and the defendant policeman is unlikely to be able to pay a substantial
judgment. The rationale of the exclusionary rule is not "punishment"
of the police. Obviously reversal of a conviction does not penalize a
policeman, whatever might be said as to its penalizing the victim or the
public. The rationale is removal of any incentive for the police to violate the rules.
A most important point to appreciate regarding the exclusionary
rule is that objections on the ground that it enables guilty people to
escape condemnation impugn the substantive rules themselves rather
than the evidentiary rule, because there is no doubt that many more
guilty people escape as a result of the presumably normal compliance of
the police with the laws that restrain their operations than escape as a
result of discovered non-compliance. If the laws restrict the police too
much, that issue should be faced directly rather than evasively by retaining the restriction and failing to implement it.
For Total Independence of the Public Defender of the Indigent1 1
[Professor Schwartz resigned from the Executive Committee of the
Philadelphia's Defender Association and brought suit to prevent a restructuring of the Association that allotted fifty percent of the control'1 Petition for Certiorari at 10-11, Schwartz v. Defender Ass'n, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079
(1973) (Douglas, Brennan, & Marshall, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari to In re Defender
Ass'n of Philadelphia, 453 Pa. 353, 307 A.2d 906 (1973)) (footnote omitted).
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ling power to the Mayor and City Council in exchange for municipal
financial support.]
The constitutional right to the assistance of counsel is violated by
any system of providing defense to the indigent which is dominated by
law enforcement authorities.
On its face, 50% of the power in the reorganized Board of Directors is in the hands of the Mayor of Philadelphia, who appoints the
Commissioner of Police and the City Solicitor, a prosecuting officer.
The Mayor is also, of course, responsible for the maintenance of order
in the City, and for the execution of its laws. But the actuality of power
is far greater than the nominal 50%. The increment of power above
50% derives from the expectable bloc voting of the Mayor's non-tenured appointees, particularly in the election of the "neutral" directors,
on the budget of the Defender, and on any other issue that concerns the
Mayor.
The existence of control and the inclination to use it are clear.
The Mayor was able to make it a condition of the deal that the incumbent Chief Defender, a political opponent, be dismissed, and that future
Chief Defenders should not enjoy a protected tenure but should be dismissable without cause. The bold proclivity of the Philadelphia executive and law enforcement authorities to put pressure on the Defender
and even the judges is revealed in the dissenting opinion below . ...
The unique structure of the reorganized Board of Directors is
stamped on its face as an impermissible sharing of power with interests
antagonistic to the defense. The tripartite arrangement, under which
enforcement authorities designate 10 directors; defense interests designate 10 directors, and these 20 designate 10 more "neutral" directors, is
plainly derived from commercial and labor arbitration. Whatever may
be the merits of such a structure for an unofficial tribunal on which
representatives of each party to a private controversy may, pursuant to
prior agreement, sit alongside "neutral" members, it is unthinkable that
defense of the indigent be so organized. Legal defense is not arbitration. It is not intended to work out practical compromises or alliances
between commercial interests. It is not intended to be "neutral." It
calls for unequivocal commitment to the interests of the accused. Even
in the military service, where of necessity the ordinary liberties of a
citizen are restricted, "command influence" in the structure of courts
martial has been abjured.
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FavoringEffective Federaljudicial Review
of Local Police Abuse 12
[In this article for The Progressive, Professor Schwartz criticized
the five-to-four decision of the United States Supreme Court in Rizzo v.
Goode.13 ]
The grounds on which Justice Rehnquist overruled the lower
courts erect insuperable barriers to efforts by civil rights groups to force
police departments to take complaints seriously. Rehnquist's judgment
that "the evidence did not establish the existence of any [department]
policy to disregard constitutional rights" apparently means that police
departments are to be immune unless they declare openly that they oppose the Constitution. It is not enough to prove twenty individual complaints within a year "in a city of three million inhabitants" (Philadelphia's population is actually two million); Blackmun pointedly inquires
whether 100 or 500 would be enough, and how long the trial would
have to last. Mere "failure to act," a willful default in supervision and
discipline in cases of police brutality, will not warrant Federal judicial
"intrusion" into the "discretion" of police management.
Most frightening of all is the Court's response to the finding by
the lower courts of a pattern of constitutional violations: "There was
no showing that the behavior of the Philadelphia police was different in
kind or degree from that which exists elsewhere. . . the problems disclosed. . . are fairly typical of. . . police departments in major urban
areas." This means that until plaintiffs can prove that the situation is
worse in Philadelphia than in New York or Chicago, there can be no
judicial relief. Wherever a suit is brought, the plaintiff will have to
show that the defendant department is worse than most. The scope of
the trial is impossibly broadened. The purpose and effect are clear: to
slam the door of the Federal court in the face of citizen groups seeking
to bring police department procedures into line with the Federal
Constitution.
Against Authorizing Police to Detain for Investigation1 4
The [American Law Institute Model Pre-Arraignment Code] proposal improperly transfers traditional judicial power to police. The Institute is presented with the choice between two basic conceptions of the
relation between the police and the judiciary:
Schwartz, A Blow Against Liberty, PROGRESSIVE, Mar. 1976, at 9.
423 U.S. 362 (1976).
14 Memorandum from Louis B. Schwartz to the American Law Institute, May 1966 (opposing Tentative Draft No. I of the ALI Model Pre-Arraignment Code).
12

13
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(i) The traditional and presently legal relationship has
the police making inquiries and conducting surveillance
without interference with anybody's freedom of movement.
When objective cause to believe in X's guilt arises, the policeman is authorized to take X into custody or preferably
summon him to appear. Custody by the policeman is converted into custody by judicial authority as soon as practicable, i.e. by preliminary hearing before a magistrate. The crucial point is that the police are never authorized to make
judgments about the need to prolong custody. It is left to
judges to make all determinations about prolonging custody.
(ii) Tentative Draft No. 1, on the other hand, leaves it
to the police themselves to judge the need, not merely to take
custody by arrest, but to prolong custody for the convenience
of investigators and prosecutors, and to obtain admissions of
criminality.
The latter is a transfer of traditional judicial power to the executive. It
may be surrounded, as it is in the draft, with many safeguards. Time
limits may be imposed. But once we approve the principle of investigation while a man is held in police custody, this mountain of safeguards
will begin to melt. In my opinion it must melt because, encumbered
with all these restraints, the change will not yield what the police say
they need. And we will already have conceded that they are entitled to
get the confessions they want. Legislatures considering our Model Code
will not feel bound by our precautionary measures, e.g. the recording of
interrogations provided by § 4.09, the hour limits set by § 4.05. Why
should they? There is nothing to support these precise limits except the
honorable impulses of the draftsmen, and I dare say that the state legislators will trust their own instincts at least as much as that of the
"professors."
Institutional Racism1 5
[Professor Schwartz and Professor Edward V. Sparer exchanged a
series of memoranda on this subject that were later printed in the University of Pennsylvania's Gazette. The following is an excerpt from one
of Professor Schwartz's memoranda.]
You quite legitimately put back to me the question that I have
repeatedly urged on you: "What is institutional racism?" My answer is
'0 Memorandum from Louis B. Schwartz to Edward V. Sparer,

March 1982, at 23, 26.

reprinted in PA. GAZETrE,
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that it is a rhetorical phrase employed as a substitute for thought, a
pejorative flexible enough to give the user psychic satisfaction without
compelling him or her to identify a particular evil or a particular
remedy.
You and I have agreed (i) that an ethnic disproportion in desirable
posts does not necessarily betoken anything that can properly be designated as racism; and (ii) that the presence of ethnic disproportions
would raise questions in the mind of persons of goodwill as to whether
institutional obstacles needlessly (even though unintentionally) obstructed access to goodies by disadvantaged groups. It seems to me
therefore that useful discourse in this realm would take the form of
assertions (and -correlative contradictions) that, for example, the requirement of creditable published scholarly work is an improper standard for professional tenure, if a Black is excluded on this ground, even
though the requirement has jeopardized 100 Whites for every Black
affected by it, and was established in societies where there was no race
issue. Whenever tests for competence have been established, whether in
medicine, engineering, music, mathematics, nuclear physics, or bar examinations, one is entitled to ask that the tests be examined for relevance to the tasks to be done, if they tend unnecessarily to ethnic disproportion. If the standards survive such reexamination, one is not
entitled to fire at random the blunderbuss, divisive charge of "racism."
Relieving the Horrors of the World War II Internment
of Japanese Americans "
[After the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941, the United
States interned its Japanese citizens in the Western Command.1
Thousands of young lawyers in many departments of the federal government in Washington, D.C. were then coopted into a corps of reviewing officers to pass upon individual applications for release from
detention. Professor Schwartz, then in the Justice Department, was a
member of this corps. He wrote the following memorandum recommending release.]
EVIDENCE: Subject is a Japanese fisherman, a member of the Terminal Island Fleet. He is 54 years old, received eight years grammar
school education in Japan and came to the United States in 1906 at the
age of 18. He returned to Japan in 1917, married and reentered the
United States with his wife in 1918. Since that time he has resided
16Memorandum from Louis B. Schwartz to Chief of Review Section, United States Dep't of
Justice (July 17, 1942).
17 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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continuously in the United- States and has been a fisherman for 28
years. He can pilot a boat and use a compass and his fishing operations
ranged from San Francisco down to the Mexican coast and out as far
as the San Clemente Islands. The hearing board found, rather mysteriously, that his boats were "equipped with radio" but "not equipped
with wireless." Subject has five children of whom the four oldest were
born in the United States and the youngest, a boy 13 years old, born in
Japan on a visit by his wife to her mother. On this same visit his wife
left their third child, a girl now 18, in Japan with her grandmother.
This girl is registered for dual citizenship in Japan. Subject explained
that his daughter in Japan registered for dual citizenship in order to
get a diploma from school. The youngest boy, born in Japan, came
back to the United States at the age of nine months and has lived here
ever since. One of subject's sons operates a chicken ranch in Alabama.
Another son is in the army. Two of them were in junior high school at
San Pedro, California. All children living in the United States attended
a Japanese language school at Terminal Island for four or five years.
Subject has had no military service; registered for deferment in
accordance with Japanese law. He belonged to no Japanese associations except the Fishermans' Association and was never an officer of
this group. He subscribes to Rafu Shimpo, a Japanese newspaper, and
denies making any contributions to Japanese war relief saying that he
was too poor and had too many children. Subject is a Buddhist and
believes in the divinity of the Emperor, explaining that he was so
taught from childhood. When asked if he would obey any command of
the Japanese Emperor he said he would hardly do so because three of
his children were United States citizens "but of course I am of Japanese citizenship." He said he wanted neither Japan nor the United
States to win the war but wanted peace. He wanted America to win for
the sake of his children but on the other hand as an individual and
subject of Japan his conscience forced him to say that he wanted Japan
to win. When asked if he thought he would be better off if Japan won
the war he said perhaps it would be better for him but not for his
children. The board commented that subject's demeanor was courteous
and serious and recommended his internment as "potentially dangerous" on account of his loyalty to Japan, the fact that one of his daughters was there and that one son was born in Japan and also "on account of his unsatisfactory answers to some of our questions."
CONCLUSION: I recommend parole for this subject. I believe that he
represents a case of honestly divided sympathies and I think the hearing board's findings show that they were not altogether clear that he
was dangerous. In the absence of any indication of subversive associa-
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tions or sentiments it seems to me unnecessarily harsh to separate such
a man from his family by internment.
Lenience to Nazi Refugees on the Question of "Moral Turpitude"
in Lying to Immigration Authorities1 8
[During the Holocaust, the lucky thousands who escaped death
sought refuge in foreign countries, including the United States. The
Immigration and Naturalization Service of the United States Department of Justice often found these refugees to have committed "crimes"
in their own countries, making them subject to deportation if those
crimes were interpreted to have involved "moral turpitude." As an
attorney in the Department of Justice, Professor Schwartz wrote the
following interpretation exonerating many refugees of "moral turpitude" in offenses committed under the duress of persecution.]
The conclusion of the immigration authorities that the alien committed
a crime is insufficient if based on anything less than unequivocal admissions with respect to every material element of the offenses. The file
does not show that any such admission has been made by Krawiecki.
He did admit to swearing to the false statement regarding his birth,
etc., but all his statements regarding the mental element of the crime
seem to be exculpatory. There is no indication that he concedes his
guilt of violating any criminal law. Even if he had made such an admission one might have questions regarding it in view of the unlikelihood that he is familiar with our law, and the ambiguities of the situation with respect to intent and motive, and in respect of the materiality
of the misstatements.
I am definitely of the opinion that under the peculiar circumstances of this case no moral turpitude is involved. The elements of
coercion are much the same as those presented in the Attorney General's opinion authorizing the admission of a German-Jew convicted of
falsifying financial statements in Germany in connection with his emigration. Lisbon, in 1940, when France had collapsed and it seemed
probable that Germany would prevail, and when frantic 6migr~s envisioned Spain as well as Portugal overrun by the Nazis, was no place
for the exercise of unbiased moral judgment. Moreover State Department communications in this file twice refer to the fact that Krawiecki
would have obtained his transit visa to the Dominican Republic even if
he had told the truth about his Polish rather than Lithuanian origin. A
's Memorandum from Louis B. Schwartz to Assistant Attorney General Wendell Berge
(Aug. 14, 1943).
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false statement regarding what appears to have been therefore an immaterial matter hardly rises (or should I say falls) to the level of moral
turpitude.
Freedom of Speech: Recommending Against Prosecution of
Columnist Drew Pearson for Criminally Libelling
Secretary of State Cordell Hull 19
In essence, Pearson makes two charges against the Secretary: (1)
That he is incompetent as shown by his official actions toward Latin
America, the Free French and the Soviet Union, and by his choice of
subordinates; and (2) that he is biased against the Soviet Union and
acts officially on the basis of this bias. As you know, the Secretary has
publicly characterized these charges as "monstrous and diabolical falsehoods" and suggested that they give aid and comfort to the enemy, and
the President is reported to have called Pearson a chronic liar.
In considering the applicability of the criminal libel statute, I assume that Pearson's statements were false and defamatory and there is
of course no question as to publication. The principal, and to my mind
insuperable, obstacle to prosecution would be the protection afforded
the defendant by the privilege of fair comment upon public officers.
This privilege, a product of the bitter English political struggles of the
17th and 18th centuries, gives immunity to criticism of a public official's conduct of or capacity for office, provided there be no actual malice. The privilege is based upon the paramount interest in free discussion of the conduct of the public affairs, and criticism of the official acts
of cabinet officers has been cited as a typical case for the operation of
the principle.
Prosecution, in the circumstances of this case, would be generally
and rightly regarded as an attack upon freedom of discussion. It would
discredit the Administration and prejudice the State Department far
more than Pearson's columns.
III.

ON ANTITRUST, ECONOMICS, AND LAW

Goals of Antitrust: Freedom and Political Responsibility2 0
The purpose of the antitrust laws is to preserve liberty, i.e., free19 Memorandum from Louis B. Schwartz to Attorney General Francis Biddle (Sept. 3,

1943).
AATTORNEY GENERAL'S NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUsT LAWS, DEP'T OF JUS-
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dom of choice and action, first in the economic sphere but ultimately in
the political sphere as well. Businessmen are to be free from direction
or coercion of other businessmen. Buyers are to be free from concerted
exploitation by sellers and vice-versa. No one is to build, alone or in
combination with others, an industrial empire of such scope that others
must perforce deal with him or on his terms. Entry into all trades and
businesses shall be as free as physical limitations permit.
This maximization of freedom is desired because of the favorable
economic consequences of competition, as is fully shown in the Majority Report; but that is not all. It is also desirable on principle and for
its own sake, like political liberty and because political liberty is jeopardized if economic power drifts into relatively few hands. The centers
of great wealth will own and influence newspapers, magazines and
broadcasters, direct the development of universities, retain the ablest
lawyers, economists and public relations specialists, finance political
parties, infiltrate or wear down the executive agencies by which they
are supposed to be regulated, and operate powerful lobbies so that the
popular will itself is shaped to their needs. In addition, individual dignity and responsibility are magnified in a free economy. Success will
not depend solely on the favor of superiors in a great pyramid of
power, but may be achieved also by striking out on one's own, winning
fortune from the patronage of fellowmen. Freedom on the economic
frontier is today's only substitute for the open Western lands which in
other generations nourished American individualism.
Antitrust as a Quasi-ConstitutionalPrinciple2 1
American antitrust laws are a product of American democratic
traditions and aspirations, suspicion of concentrated power combined
with self-interest, and skepticism about bureaucratic "expertise"
whether in government or in the management of giant firms and associations. The goals of the antitrust system are broader than economic
efficiency, a quality wlich "antitrusters" believe difficult to appraise by
any standard other than success in a competitive market. The goals, in
short, are political and social as well as economic. It is believed that
concentrated economic power tends to dominate government and hence
leads to authoritarian societies. It was on this theory, as well as upon
TIC. (1955), reprinted in Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. (Part 1) 244, 259-60 (1955) and in I ANTITRUST BULL. 37, 38-39 (1955) (Louis
B. Schwartz dissenting from Majority Report) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust
Committee Dissent].
" Schwartz, American Antitrust Laws and Free Enterprise,SWISS REV. INT'L ANTITRUST
LAW, Jan. 1978, at 3-5.
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the belief that a competitive society is the strongest and most dynamic,
that the United States, after World War II, pressed for antitrust regimes in Germany, Japan, and other countries receiving Marshall Plan
aid.
On the domestic front, the Americans view cartels and monopolies
as usurping governmental power when they "regulate" commerce by
controlling prices, terms of trade, production, marketing territories, or
the free decisions of other entrepreneurs. The United States Supreme
Court has noted that our Constitution designates Congress-i.e. a politically responsive body-as the agency to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce. The power of a cartel or monopoly to raise prices is seen as
"taxation without representation," a slogan which animated the American Revolution against England. The antitrust laws do not, however,
express a preference for political control of economic decision. On the
contrary, "antitrusters" are inclined to oppose or minimize government
intervention unless free enterprise solutions demonstrably fail to achieve
social goals. It is for this reason that antitrust enjoys the support in
principle of the whole spectrum of American business, although in
practice each industry may be constantly seeking to insulate itself from
antitrust controls. Paradoxically, the antitrust program, although aimed
at minimizing government regulation, may actually entail considerable
government intervention, e.g., by complex judicial injunctions designed
to maintain workably competitive markets. A major reason why antitrusters seek to limit the replacement of competition by government
regulation is that regulating agencies tend to become dominated by the
industry's viewpoint.
Finally, antitrust goals include certain beneficial effects on the
quality of life. Free enterprise is more likely than government controls
to give us a variety of products and services, a variety of points of view
in books, newspapers, movies, and sports, wider choice of employment,
more responsiveness of firms to local exigencies, etc. .
The foregoing explains the remarkable assimilation of antitrust to
a constitutional principle in American jurisprudence. The United
States Supreme Court has said:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as
important to the preservation of economic freedom and our
free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.
Expressing, therefore, a quasi-constitutional principle, the antitrust law
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is not inhibited by any perceived conflict with "freedom of contract."
Not only contract law, but also the law of property, of freedom of association, of agency, and of patent must yield to the principle that legal
rights may not be so massed and exercised as to trammel the equally
respected freedoms of others.
The Non-Economic Component of Antitrust Policy22
The non-economic component of American antitrust policy stands
. . . out strikingly if one broadens the perspective beyond congressional
legislation to consider that major historic event, American imposition of
antitrust measures upon conquered Germany and Japan after World
War II. No one then suggested that our zeal for industrial deconcentration there was an attempt to impose diseconomies on the defeated. Some
believed that the rapid reconstruction of those devastated economies
called for decartelization and decentralization. But clearly the dominant
motivation was political: a desire to create alternative centers of power
that could not readily be marshalled behind authoritarian regimes. I
have elsewhere explored "Authoritarian Aspects of Bigness" as a political theme in the antitrust symphony. Finally, it is well known that one
goal of the antitrust laws is to avert the need for massive and ongoing
government regulation or nationalization-precisely the political goal
that has brought even sophisticated businessmen to join in the American consensus supporting the antitrust principle, however avidly each
businessman may seek exemption for his own business.
The dogma that "antitrust laws protect competition not competitors" overstates the case and ignores considerations of justice. One must
amend that declaration by adding at least the following qualification:
"unless individual competitors must be protected in the interests of preserving competition." A conspiracy to put a single small competitor out
of business violates the Sherman Act even if there is no showing of
significant impact on competition generally. In the Robinson-Patman
Act, Congress explicitly extended the anti-discrimination ban to attempts to eliminate "a competitor" as well as to cases of impairment of
competition. These may be regarded as instances of Congress' concern
with "incipient" impairment of competition or desire to prevent transactions, trivial in themselves, which might "trigger" a series of similar
transactions. But they also may be seen as a congressional concern for a
non-economic goal: "justice," in the sense of fair and equal treatment of
persons in like situations.
2, Schwartz, "Justice"and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
1076, 1076-78 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
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Economics, "Populism" and Antitrust2
The key to Areeda's and Turner's approach to antitrust issues,
intellectually, is an obsession with "populism." Juxtaposing it to "economics," "efficiency," and optimum allocation of resources, they present populism as a crude, confused yearning for income equalization,
dispersion of economic and political power, and "atomization" of industry, and an aspiration for the virtues of yeomanry. According to Areeda
and Turner, "populist goals should be given little or no independent
weight in formulating antitrust rules and presumptions." The errors of
populism are attacked with theological fervor that is at times self-caricaturing, as when "populists" are chastised for the "peculiar and perverse" rejection of
the right to develop and practice new and more efficient
methods of doing business or to provide consumers with better products and services. Those who have espoused the primacy of [populist] goals have either indulged in euphemism,
mistakenly assumed that one man's entrepreneurial initiative
would rarely if ever limit the options of others, or simply
failed to think their concepts through.
One would be hard put to find protagonists of the perverse "primacy" that the authors so mercilessly expose, or indeed any critics of
Areeda's and Turner's policy stance who march under the banner of
populism. "Populism" becomes, therefore, merely an epithet, a stick to
beat people and ideas, useful against "fellow travelers" as well as
against heterodox sectaries. It is sad that "populism" can be so used,
but this reviewer sees hope and portent in the history of populism's
tenets which have become today's orthodoxies: antitrust laws, railroad
regulation, regulation of stock and commodities markets, wage-hour
legislation, protection of collective bargaining, child labor laws, and
taxation of income at progressive rates.
I attribute the affinity of some fine legal minds for the imponderables of economics to the fact that economists talk the language of numbers and depict their models, however remote from the real world, in
graphs whose alluring curves intersect with gratifying precision. The
aversion to the incommensurable reaches its peak in Areeda's and Turner's proposition, astounding for lawyers, that "[a]s a goal of antitrust
policy, 'fairness' is a vagrant claim applied to any value that one hap2S Schwartz, On the Uses of Economics: A Review of the Antitrust Treatises, 128 U. PA. L.
REV. 244, 246, 250 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
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pens to favor." They are, of course, perfectly right in pointing out that
interest groups have different views of what is fair and have sometimes
successfully lobbied, in the name of fairness, for special protections and
subsidies inconsistent with competition and the interests of consumers.
But if imprecision and the possibility of perversion were fatal defects,
the due process clause would long ago have been repealed, and the constitutional attack upon the Sherman act for vagueness would not have
failed in Nash v. United States. It would have been better for Areeda
and Turner to accept fairness as an ingredient of antitrust calculations
than to proscribe it as a goal of the antitrust laws. Indeed, fairness is so
deeply ingrained in the antitrust tradition, from the common law background through the protests against Rockefeller predation in the oil industry, that "choosing the economic goals" to the exclusion of fairness
assumes the proportions of radical historical revisionism.
Institutional Size and Individual Liberty:
Authoritarian Aspects of Bigness 2
The theme of this essay is that the main significance of large size
in units of social organization lies in their tendency to substitute compulsion in place of persuasion, to emphasize discipline rather than liberty. I speak of the giant business corporation, the industry-wide union,
the massive political party or church, the huge charitable foundation,
entities like the Army, the Navy, or the Atomic Energy Commission,
and of the great nation-states themselves. For present purposes, I see
these overpowering units as more alike in their bigness than differing
on account of the diversity of their products, techniques, goals. The
characteristic feature which distinguishes the big unit from an aggregation of smaller units loosely linked together by contracts, common membership in trade associations, federations of unions, or leagues of nations, is that the big unit typically conducts its operations by mandatory
orders directed from higher to lower echelons, whereas persuasion and
negotiation are the techniques of collaboration in a confederacy.
It must not be assumed from the title of this essay or from the
contrast which has just been drawn that Bigness is inevitably bad.
Neither is authoritarianism or dictatorship always and in all places to
be condemned. Some degree of coercion is necessary to maintain individual security and freedom. Without such coercion more individual
freedom would be lost by the encroachment of undisciplined individuals
than is lost in the process of government. No one supposes that an
24 Schwartz, InstitutionalSize and Individual Liberty: AuthoritarianAspects of Bigness, 55
NW. U.L. REV. 4, 4-5 (1960).
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army should be run by caucus or majority vote. The centralized political despotism of absolute monarchy may be a necessary intermediate
stage of political evolution from oppression by regional tyrants to constitutional democracy. Two massive political parties may be preferable,
in some ways, to multi-party strife and government by unstable coalitions. Finally, all must recognize that in the sphere of industrial organization, units of very large size are required to achieve some technological goals.
If large social units are, therefore, inevitable or desirable for some
purposes at some times, it is nevertheless important to bear in mind the
disadvantages as well as the advantages of bigness, to disentangle the
real advantages from the mythical ones with which all important institutions surround themselves, and to ask constantly whether on balance
the units are not bigger than they need be.
25

The Contagious Quality of Bigness

Size, then, can make itself appear indispensable: one has only to
monopolize enough of an important technology and the courts will fear
to lay hands on the structure. And size begets size: the hugeness of the
leaders of one industry will save the monopolist in another industry
from dismemberment. This contagious quality of bigness manifests itself in many ways in today's economy. Banks merge because only giant
banks can handle the financing of giant industry. But a very large bank
must make large loans and therefore courts big industry with special
favor. Suppliers and customers are driven to integrate, if only to
achieve the "countervailing power" upon which some economists have
now been driven to rely in place of competition. Only big newspapers
and broadcasting chains can provide the advertising coverage required
by the great selling combines, and only the latter can pay the rates. The
upshot is clear: integrate or disappear. Moreover, there has appeared
an irrational psychology of competition among managements to be
"Number One," "the Biggest," even if this is accomplished by buying
out unprofitable firms. The same psychology is reflected in a stock market phenomenon: the invariably bullish character of any merger announcement, without regard to underlying business factors.
Only intervention by the legislature can roll back the tide of monopoly. The nature of the intervention has already been indicated.
There must be a legislative investigation of the justification for our very
"5Antitrust Committee Dissent, supra note 20, reprinted in HearingsBefore the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (Part 1) at 262-63, and in 1 ANTITRUST
BULL. at 45.
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largest aggregations of financial and industrial control, probably followed by a statute authorizing an appropriate agency to bring these
enterprises into some reasonable relationship with technological
requirements.
The Need for Judicial Review of Consent Decrees2 8
The Report [of the National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws] recommends that the Department of Justice enter into negotiations with prospective defendants for consent decrees. Such a practice
will certainly have the advantage claimed for it in the Majority Report,
namely, "increased cooperation between business and Government,"
saving time and money. What it will also do is whittle away the last
remnants of judicial control and public scrutiny in this area, and involve the Government in bargaining with a law violator not only as to
the relief but also as to the nature of the accusation to be made against
him. The proposal opens the possibility that the Government's complaint will be modified so as to be consistent with the relief that defendant is prepared to consent to. But the settlement of an antitrust case
ought not to be a simple matter of bargain between the Department
and the defendant. It results in a court order, enforceable by contempt
proceedings. No judge should abdicate his own responsibility in this
field, although admittedly he must rely to a considerable extent on the
prosecutor's willingness to accept the relief embodied in the tendered
decree. This judicial function is undermined if the Government does
not state its case independently and in advance of the settlement. Furthermore, not only the court but also Congress and the public are excluded from any basis for exercising a critical judgment regarding the
compromise embodied in the decree.
Instead of urging the Department to broaden its use of the consent
decree, the Committee ought to have considered certain proposals made
to it, but not reflected in the Report, for greater safeguards on the present consent decree procedure. One of these proposals would have required the Department to publish an opinion accompanying each consent decree, stating the Department's case, the defendant's position, and
the reasons for the Department's acceptance of the particular compromise. It is well known that the necessity to give reasons for disposition
" Id., HearingsBefore the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, at 266-67, 1 ANTITRUST
BULL. at 52-54. Most of the views Professor Schwartz expressed in this excerpt were later enacted
into law in the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties (Tunney) Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h)
(1976).
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help to assure that they will be reasonable. The other proposal would
have made it a matter for the judge's discretion whether or not a consent judgment should constitute prima facie evidence in subsequent private antitrust suits. Present law provides that in no case shall a consent
decree, entered before testimony is taken, be available to help the private victims recover antitrust damages from the defendant. Few victims
are financially able to assemble the evidence required to prove an antitrust violation against a great combine. One would think it a proper
part of the Government's responsibility to see that private victims are
made whole. But in practice in the majority of antitrust cases which are
settled by consent decree the Government is, in effect, bargaining away
all real possibility of recovery by private victims.
Rebutting a Liberal'sAttack on the Antitrust Laws2
Foremost among the obsolete myths and rituals [that, according to
Professor Galbraith, obscure society's picture of itself] are the notions
that competition is a significant restrainer of economic decision and that
the antitrust laws serve the purpose of maintaining the competitive
market. It is an old point with Galbraith. He made it in American
Capitalism: The Concept of CountervailingPower, in 1952, and it had
been made before that by Thurman Arnold, among others, in The
Folklore of Capitalism,in 1937. According to these "realists," antitrust
activity is a facade of superficial government intervention that, without
actually restraining private power, aims to reassure simpletons that
their lives are not being managed ...
I never took Galbraith's American Capitalism seriously on antitrust, and I don't think he is to be taken seriously now. In American
Capitalism, Galbraith discounted competition as a goad to progress or
restraint on greed. He identified the real governor of modern economies
as the balance of power between the giant producer and giant distributor, giant employer and giant unions, and so forth. Not many people
noticed the admission near the end of the book that this system of mutual restraint would not work in a period of inflation, when all the
giants would make common cause against the unorganized consumers,
mostly poor. In other words, the Galbraithean proposition that the antitrust laws are superfluous and obsolete would concededly be invalid
for any time since the depression of the thirties and for any time in the
foreseeable future, for we live in an era of perpetual, moderate,
planned inflation. The author who emerged in American Capitalismas
" Schwartz, Book Review, 81 HARV. L. REV. 915, 919, 922 (1968) (reviewing
BRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967)) (footnote omitted).
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our most delightful tongue-in-cheek pundit maintains that distinction in
The New Industrial State.
Until someone proffers more practical devices for asserting the
value of individualism, of the pluralistic society, of the separation of
political and economic power, of the kind of planning that starts from
unmanipulated human wants, pragmatic meliorists may prefer to stick
with the antitrust laws. They are imperfect. They are only partially
enforced. They constantly confront us with paradoxes, as when they
are invoked against minor mergers but seem impotent against the greatest consolidations. But ultimately they stand for accountability of private economic power. From the powerhouse Messrs. Sherman and
Clayton built flows an energy that is felt not only in prosecutions, injunctions, and cease-and-desist orders, but also in continuing congressional committee inquiries into oppressive business practices, in significant modifications of regulatory legislation and administration to
maximize freedom, and, as any antitrust lawyer knows, in a stream of
influential advice to the technostructure deflecting the planners from at
least the excesses of autocracy.
Planningand the Designed Planlessness of Antitrust 8
The United States is an underdeveloped country which must increasingly resort to national planning to achieve its goals. The antitrust
laws are essentially an affirmation of the desirability of what might be
called "planlessness," that is, free development of private business subject to the discipline of competition but without centralized direction
either by the government or by monopolies and cartels. What is the
future of antitrust in an age of planning? To answer this question we
must reflect upon the necessity for certain kinds of national planning,
and upon the continuing validity of the principle of designed planlessness in some sectors of the economy.
The United States is an underdeveloped country. That is, its legitimate aspirations and national commitments vastly exceed available resources. The ratio of American aspirations to resources-and this is the
meaningful index of underdevelopment in the political and psychological sense-may be higher in the United States than in any other country in the world. We would conquer space. We would ring the earth
with artificial satellites. We would provide our physicists with billiondollar instruments to hunt subatomic particles. We would build super18

Schwartz, Antitrust in the Age of Planning,in CROSSROADS PAPERS 242 (1965).
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sonic planes. We would conquer poverty in our time, and ignorance,
and disease, mental as well as physical. Decent American homes will
stand where wretched tenements now blot the landscape and twist the
lives of millions. Bright schools and teachers are to open the minds of
myriads now condemned to subliteracy, perpetually banished from the
world of today's skills and culture. We require vast expansion of medical research and care, of hospital facilities, of day nurseries and recreation facilities. Marginal farmers and redundant coal miners are to be
relocated, retrained. The very face of the land is to be remade with
dams, tunnels, roads, airports, open spaces, new forests. Total or even
merely sensible military defense demands its incalculable billions of us.
And of all these good things we visualize for ourselves, we mean to
provide a share also to the needier nations through generous foreign-aid
programs.
But all these splendid aspirations cannot be achieved now or in a
generation. We must make choices. We must decide whether homes are
more important than roads, a hundred thousand schools more important than moon travel, whether to build first an additional medical
school, a 100 BEV accelerator, or an intercontinental missile. The
choices to be made are of course much more subtle than "either-or." It
is a question of timing in the deployment of resources. Large immediate
investments in Project A may be necessary now to supply the requirements of Project B later. Project B may be the most pressing ultimate
goal; yet for the present it would be pointless to do more than make a
small initial allocation of resources. This is why an underdeveloped
country must plan.
Planning must extend to major categories of private expenditure as
well as to items normally covered in governmental budgets. The investment projections of AT&T or General Motors are as significant for
national development as those of the Tennessee Valley Authority, and
make comparable demands on resources. Levels of production of wheat
or housing are critical elements in the shaping of our future, regardless
of the fact that production is and will remain largely in private hands.
It is astonishing how little planning of national economic goals this
country has had. No one has come forward with a rational ordering of
goals including estimates of cost matched to specific resources from income and borrowing: not the government, not the major political parties, not the intellectual liberal groups, not the economists. Instead,
thought and discussion have focused on abstractions like "growth rates"
expressed as a percentage of increase of Gross National Product-as if
it were of little importance what kinds of goods and services composed
the increase or, for that matter, the base figure. Or there has been what
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might be called fragmental planning, the uncoordinated announcement
by interested groups of their particular demands: for defense, for housing, for education, for medicare, or new prisons and probation services,
etc., each estimate made utterly without reference to competing demands. In the aggregate these demands are so unrealistic as to be completely irresponsible and amount to no plan at all. Sometimes we are
bemused by what appears to be comprehensive planning but turns out
to be mere forecasting of the results of unplanning or of private planning by interested enterprises. I speak here of input-output analysis,
which takes as its starting point projected investment and marketing
plans of the private sector of the economy, anticipated consumer demands (themselves largely directed by producer decisions and advertising), and government spending. The analysis then derives from these
projections a series of quantities of designated types of goods which
must be produced if the projections are to be realized. This sort of
thing, if it can be called planning at all, has little to do with the selection and ordering of rational objectives; it merely facilitates the logistics
of campaigns planned by someone else.
Reflections on the Breakdown of Rate Regulation
under Inflationary Pressures2 9
If any conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing survey, they
might be stated as follows: Inflation sets up powerful forces directed at
modifying classic regulatory rules, including the rule that limits regulated utility returns by reference to an historic cost rate base. A rule so
widely evaded seems to demand fundamental reexamination; yet, no
principled and politically acceptable alternative has been found. Certainly, a general return to replacement costs seems out of the question
for all the reasons advanced against it long ago by Brandeis and others.
However, although those reasons remain valid against enshrining replacement costs as a constitutionally required standard of remunerating
investors, they may not preclude consideration of replacement costs as a
matter of legislative or administrative policy.
But what policy? Should regulation promote for unfortunate utility investors, a "bailout" policy like the federal government's debt guarantees and capital grants to railroads, Chrysler, savings and loan associations, and other private enterprises that would otherwise be
squeezed out in bankruptcy? If some larger national goal, such as preserving the stability of banks and insurance companies or maintaining
" Schwartz, Inflation and Utility Rate Regulation, 1982 UTAH L. RE'V. 89, 122-23 (footnote

omitted).
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the incomes of widows and orphans dependent on old utility investments, calls for such a policy, should the fiscal burden be put on consumers or on the taxpayer? In pursuing that goal, how much weight
should be given to the social desirability of holding down residential
rates as compared to commercial and industrial rates?
Inflation is, after all, a vast transfer of income, from creditors to
debtors, from fixed income pensioners to organized workers. Accordingly, the seismic tremors of inflation, breaking up old patterns of regulation, stir new demands for redistribution of income. Can such a large
political issue as income redistribution be rationally dealt with in
quasi-judicial administrative proceedings? If we cannot regulate in old
ways, if we see no credible new principle of regulation, if vast private
enterprises totter, if new social demands must be met, does nationalization become a more attractive alternative than it has seemed in the
past?
The OPEC Example: Capitalism, Competition and Cartels"0
Take note-consumers, believers in the "science" of economics,
adherents of a naive capitalism-of the dismay with which the financial
community and government circles confront the prospect that oil prices
might fall because of the disintegration of OPEC.
One senior administrative official in Washington says the administration is "worried sick" about the possibility of a "real break" in oil
prices. The United States had hoped that the oil-producing countries
would set production quotas that might have limited any price decline
to about $2 a barrel.
The real and immense blessing that a drastic decline in oil prices
promises has not received adequate public attention. If the price
dropped from $34 a barrel to $10 a barrel (a generous estimate of cost
of production including reasonable profit), that would be the equivalent
of a tax cut of almost $150 billion dollars. At the gas pump the
equivalent price drop would be approximately 48 cents a gallon.
If the administration had the courage to levy a tax on oil
equivalent to the price drop, thus keeping consumer prices level, the
overwhelming problem of budget deficits would be solved at one stroke,
interest rates would fall, houses would be built, employment would
rise, and the long-promised economic recovery might begin.
A substantial drop in oil prices would, of course, cut the inflation
o Schwartz, The OPEC Example: Capitalism, Competition and Cartels, Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 6, 1983, at G7, col. 1.
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rate, rescue the ailing airlines, help the truckers, and cut the fuel and
fertilizer costs of farmers. The adverse balance of our foreign trade
would be wiped out. The desperate plight of Third World countries,
drained of resources by the savagely inflated oil price, would be
ameliorated.
The public should understand that the alliance between our own
government and the oil cartel is not new, but of long standing. The
Gerald Ford-Henry Kissinger policy when confronted with the formation of OPEC was collaboration, not resistance. Opposition would have
meant centralizing oil imports in a federal agency that would therefore
have the power to offset the cartel with centralized buying power that
could play one OPEC member off against another.
Opposition would have meant a crash program of governmentsubsidized and government-owned exploration, on the continental shelf
and elsewhere, Instead, the wily Kissinger chose, like the Romans of
old, to pay off the peripheral tribes in arms and cash.
Long before Kissinger, national oil policy supported a cartel of our
own oil-producing states so that they could limit production and maintain high oil prices at the expense of the rest of the country-our domestic version of OPEC. When foreign oil was cheap, our own government imposed import quotas, with the effect of causing us to use up our
domestic oil reserve faster, as well as holding up domestic prices.
The full force of this paradox can be seen when we note the present policy of buying high-price foreign oil to be stored underground as
a reserve against the possibility of renewed Arab boycott. First we take
out our own so we become dependent on them; then, as rapidly as they
permit, we replace it at high cost as a reserve against the possibility of
renewed boycott. Meanwhile our foreign policy in the Middle East is
hostage to oil sheiks.
Establishment economists have contributed to our national acquiescence in submitting to extortion, providing such rationales as the beneficent effect of the price increases in promoting conservation through
redesign of our automobiles and conversion of oil-burning utilities to
other fuels. They have even suggested that quadrupling the price by
cartel agreement merely achieved an approximation of a "free market"
price, oil having in their view been previously underpriced.
Notably wanting has been any denunciation by economists of the
massive misallocation of resources when the price of energy is raised to
10 times its cost, with a consequent transfer of wealth on the order of
hundreds of billions of dollars to people who did not incur the costs of
finding and producing the oil. Instead the theologians of economics display a jesuitical facility in vindicating the status quo, as now in joining
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the chorus of warnings against "disaster" if the international banks
can't collect their bad loans.
The very language in which the mass media discuss consumer issues has been corrupted. 1984 is very close, but Orwell's "newspeak"
has long been anticipated. On our financial pages, good crops are reported as disasters, because prices drop. Nobody celebrates this rate dispensation for the poor at home and abroad. If an outbreak of competition among gas distributors temporarily reduces the price at the pump,
we hear about it in the deploring concepts of the merchant, not the
customer. The event is reported as a "price war," with all the pejorative implications of armed and bloody international conflict: Wars are
something to put an end to.
When "peace" has been declared (i.e. prices go up again), we are
all supposed to be happier. We see here the same distortions of capitalism that lead some to face real war and gross distention or arms production with equanimity because they "help to end" unemployment
and economic depression.
Capitalism has immense potentials for freedom and progress. But
capitalism implies competition, not cartels. Capitalism implies the loss
of imprudent investments, not a tax on the public to rescue improvident
international bankers or overextended speculators on escalating oil
prices. Capitalism is too important to be entrusted to capitalists.
On the Relation of Economics to Law I"3
What are the proper uses of economics? First, it seems clear that lawyers, judges, and legislatures should not delegate decisionmaking to
economists. Their dogmas are no better than ours. Their counsel is divided, and even their consensus, shifting from time to time, cannot provide a firm basis for policy decisions. The insights of their dissidents
may be as valid as those of their professional establishment. There is
too little empirical basis for economic doctrine, too little correspondence
between its models and real life, and virtually no possibility of confirmation by experiment. Its record on predictions is abysmal. The unworldliness of this discipline is manifested in its avowed disinclination,
or inability, to make or take account of moral, psychological, political,
or other "value" judgments; it is essentially a matter of indifference for
most of the profession what proportions of the "gross national product"
consist of cigarettes, bread, pornography, advertising, low-cost housing,
SI

Schwartz, supra note 23, at 266-68 (footnotes omitted).

19831

LOUIS B. SCHWARTZ

or weaponry.
But the radical skepticism expressed in the preceding paragraph is
appropriate only as a preachment to those who have been oversold.
That sort of destructive barrage could be levelled at any who espouse so
dogmatically the theories of philosophy, history, political science, anthropology, sociology, psychiatry, religion, or other branches of learning
with which we do and must seek to illuminate the human condition. All
these disciplines help, or seem to help, us comprehend or order the
infinite chaos that would otherwise confront us ...
Thus our ideal legislator, judge, or lawyer must look at the world
through all available lenses, including those of the economist.
Surely these "lenses" ought not be limited to those provided by a
single school of economists. One of the dangers of attempting to educate
lawyers and judges in economics (or psychiatry, for that matter) is that
the exposure will be to a single teacher or school, with understatement
of conflicting views. Another danger is that limited training in an esoteric art will induce, in some of the trainees, illusions of being an artist.
Moreover, gratified to be admitted to the society of the cognoscenti,
judges will become too receptive to the notion that the laity, the jury, is
an obstruction to decisionmaking in "complex cases." A third danger is
that a person who has taken a course or even several courses in economics as an undergraduate or in law school will, twenty years later,
be spouting or relying on obsolete, but firmly entrenched, economic
dogmas. There is still much to be said for using expert testimony or
counsel's extraction from and interpretation of current economic literature to "educate" judges and juries in adversary proceedings. Counsel
will need advice from economists to perform this role well, just as they
need expert psychiatrists, engineers, accountants, chemists, statisticians,
or art critics in litigation involving these other mysteries.
On the Relation of Economics to Law 112
The disciplines are obviously complementary. Economics-even at
its most speculative and abstract-is perpetually exposing old errors
and new considerations relevant to decisionmaking in government. Law
is perpetually reformulating the equations by which governmental decisions are reached. Those equations contain many variables that are
non-economic: notions of fairness and national priority, administrative
feasibility, political feasibility, the desirability of disposing of complex
questions under rubrics simple enough to be appraised by legislature
32 Schwartz, Book Review, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 584, 594-96 (1972) (reviewing A. KAHN,
THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS (1970-71)) (footnote omitted).
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and public. If the equation occasionally seems to deprecate the economic variable, that is more likely accounted for by the counterweight
of other factors than by legal resistance to economic enlightenment. If
the equation seems at times stubbornly resistant to change, it is because
stability is itself a value in the equation. Economists too "temper principle with practicality" by accepting, for the sake of stability in utility
rates, long range marginal costs rather than theoretically superior short
range costs as the standard.
In relation to the legal order, other social sciences are in much the
same position as economics. The psychiatrist makes an essential contribution to criminal proceedings when he throws light on the emotional
organization of the accused, the extent of his power to choose between
desirable and undesirable courses of conduct. But the personality of the
accused is only one of many variables in the legal equation; and a psychiatrist who fails to perceive this is likely to feel acute frustration
when a man whom he regards as "ill" is nevertheless held "responsible." He may even see such a judgment in terms of lawyers or jurors
presuming to negate professional diagnosis. He will regard the statutory formula separating the punishable from the exculpatingly ill,
whether McNaughten's rules, Durham, or American Law Institute,
contemptuously as a "legal" definition of a medical concept. Any such
formulation is, on the contrary, only an administrable rule-of-thumb
that takes account-well or poorly-of such non-medical considerations
as: the pervasiveness and incalculable diversity of human "abnormality"; the inherence of social and philosophic elements in the concept of
mental illness; the dearth of techniques and physical resources for the
"cure" of many forms of psychic deviation; and certainly the need (at
the guilt-determining stage of trial, although not perhaps at the sentencing stage) to have rules disposing of categories of cases, so that the
law will at least appear to operate with a degree of consistency in similar cases.
An historian too, applying the criteria of his speciality to the criminal trial, would be likely to come away with scorn for this perverted
way of "searching for the truth." Who ever heard of rejecting a conclusion merely because it is not "established beyond a reasonable doubt"?
What even-handed searcher for truth would categorically exclude from
consideration hearsay, testimony of a spouse against his mate, a confession obtained by pressure, incriminating evidence illegally obtained by
the police? What historian would withhold an adverse judgment on a
figure of the past until he could provide a lawyer for the defense? Shall
journalists and good citizens-amateur historians, all-really doubt the
guilt of Oswald, "alleged" assassin of President Kennedy, because the
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"presumption of innocence" has never been accorded to him in a legal
proceeding? The answer to these rhetorical questions lies, of course, in
the fact that a criminal trial is not an abstract search for historic verity.
The trial lies primarily in the realm of action, not cognition. A man's
fate is to be disposed of, and in a procedure that calls into question the
tactics of government as much as the behavior of the accused. We are
committed to the proposition that it is better for ten guilty to go free
rather than one innocent be condemned. We know and intend that a
verdict of "not guilty" means only "not sufficiently proved" or even
"proved but the law is silly." Painfully aware of the frailties of the trial
process even at its best, and perhaps in anxious dubiety about the utility of the entire system of prosecution and punishment, we erect "arbitrary" barriers against conviction like the statute of limitations and the
rule against double jeopardy. In sum, the range of consideration is
enormously broader and different for lawyers than for historians.
The X-ray chooses not to see skin, fat, any tissue extraneous to the
target of its probe. Intellectual specialists must similarly blind themselves to much that is ultimately relevant, in order to see more deeply.
The economist necessarily excludes from the range of his inquiry much
that the lawyer cannot ignore. The mathematical economist excludes
much that the institutional economist regards as vital. Agricultural engineers, social psychologists, demographers, philosophers, and public
relations wizards, whose sciences feed into economics, presumably reproach economists for a certain imperviousness to their respective
illuminations.
For me, the moral of all this is the necessity for professional modesty. The X-ray must not suffer the illusion that it sees all. The general
practitioner must not imagine that he has X-ray eyes, but must be ever
ready to examine those shadowy transparencies submitted to him by the
radiologist, and to listen comprehendingly to the specialist's interpretation. The boundaries between the professions must remain permeable,
and we must honor the border-raiders.
IV.

ON BEING A LAWYER

A Self-Image for Lawyers3"
Law students frequently have a poor professional self-image.
There is an age-old, vulgar (but not entirely baseless!) view of lawyers
as unprincipled, contentious, pettifogging, and mercenary. Much of this
Il L. Schwartz, Studying Law for Fun and Profit 22-23 (1980) (published by University of
Pennsylvania Law School).
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villainous caricature derives from the inescapably adversary quality of
much of a lawyer's work-he or she seems ready to offer services to
either side, and by the law of averages half of the clients will end up
disappointed. How much better off our medical colleagues are! Their
clearly identified opponents, illness and death, always wear black hats.
Their young patients almost always recover, whether because of or despite treatment. When their old patients die, nature, God, or the devil
gets the blame. How easy it is for a farmer to be a "moral" man; he
deals principally with soil, weather, machines, weeds, pests and other
non-human adversaries. Thus he is largely immune to the interpersonal
pressure and temptations which are the lawyers' entire milieu. Nevertheless, the following characterizations of lawyers are descriptively true
for many of them and certainly a valid professional ideal.
The lawyer is a planner, a negotiator, a peace-maker.
Despite the popular stereotype of the lawyer as contentious
adversary, the peaceful ordering of human relations overwhelmingly predominates in his activities. In the drafting of
commercial and labor contracts, treaties, wills, constitutions,
he or she is concerned with achieving orderly arrangements
and with avoiding or settling controversy. This requires imaginative anticipation of contingencies, changes of fortune,
tragedies, betrayals, and social change.
The lawyer is a counselor, advising individuals in their
varied and complex relationships with one another and the
state. Similarly the lawyer advises groups, corporations, unions, ethnic communities, cities, states, federal departments
and agencies, international organizations. In giving advice he
or she brings into play the lawyer's specialized understanding of the formal structure of society and of law as an instrument of social control and betterment.
The lawyer is an advocate, representing the views,
needs and aspirations of others more effectively than they,
uncounseled, could do by themselves.
The lawyer is a defender of the rights of the individual
against the conformist pressures of society.
The lawyer is an architect of social structure, responding creatively to the needs of a rapidly changing society.
The lawyer is a social scientist, drawing upon economics, history, sociology, psychology, political science, and anthropology to deal with the problems of individuals, organizations and communities.
The lawyer is an educator, especially a self-educator.
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The process of educating a lawyer never ends. In every controversy he or she must refresh expertise or acquire expertise
in a new factual domain.
The lawyer is a humanist. To study law is to look
through the greatest window of life. Here one sees the passions, the frailities, the aspirations, the baseness and the nobility of the human condition.
The lawyer is a leader. All other qualifications converge
in thrusting upon the lawyer leadership and responsibility in
community life.
Lawyers Must Be Broadly Cultivated: To Be Only a
Lawyer Is To Be Half of a Lawyer
The three years of law school are not mere "preparation" for life
but rather a significant segment of actual living. That living will be
enriched if you enter broadly into the life of the university, the city, and
its hinterland. That hinterland includes not only the remarkable counties of Eastern Pennsylvania, nearby Delaware and Maryland, the
beaches and Babylons of the Jersey Coast, but also two well-known
suburbs of Philadelphia, New York City and Washington. Immediately
at hand, because you are on the campus of a great university, are innumerable opportunities for stretching your intellectual horizons and cultivating your sensibilities: concerts, plays, films, lectures by outstanding
men (both visitors and members of the faculty in their regular courses),
a world-renowned archaeological museum, the venturesome Institute of
Contemporary Art, etc. To be only a lawyer is to be half a lawyer.
A good legal education is worthwhile not only to those who plan to
practice law but also to prospective businessmen, political leaders, novelists, philosophers and chess players. Consider the following sample of
literary and artistic careers which followed law training: poets-. John
Donne, Wallace Stevens, Archibald MacLeish (see his Apologia, relating law study to poetry, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1505 (1972)), Edgar Lee
Masters, Robert Louis Stevenson, Garcia Lorca; novelists: James,
Galsworthy, Meredith, Fielding, Scott, Kafka, Flaubert, Balzac, Perez
Galdos, Benavente; other literary figures- Boswell, A.P. Herbert, Gilbert (of Gilbert & Sullivan), Corneille, Moliere; philosophers: Hume,
Bentham, Bacon, More. Consider also the sociologist David Riesman;
the painter and chess player, Camille Duchamps.
34

Id. at 8.
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One's notion of justice will be strongly influenced by political ideology. If you are acutely sensitive to the wretchedness of poverty or to
dehumanizing effects of racial discrimination, you are likely to disfavor
all outcomes adverse to a disadvantaged person. If you believe that officials do most things badly, that political "solutions" are often worse
than the disease, you will be inclined to minimize the role of government, to let "free market" forces operate, to be skeptical of legal innovations. Your attitude towards law and justice will be affected by your
belief or disbelief in God, progress, original sin, dialectic materialism,
Darwinian natural selection, quietism, existentialism, etc. Everyone has
a mind-set; but the key to comprehending and practicing a democratic,
pluralistic legality is that the law exists to enable persons and groups of
radically different mind-sets to live together peaceably. The basic technique is to convert ideological conflict into pragmatic or procedural
conflicts to be resolved by tribunals operating in accordance with rules
generally recognized as fair. To argue about whether abortion is sin or
murder, on the one hand, or social necessity and inviolable individual
right, on the other, is to prepare for civil war. To assemble evidence as
to the effectiveness of repression, the inequality of access to abortion by
rich and poor, the death rates in normal birth, legal abortion, and illegal abortion, to analyze precedents under the Due Process Clause-all
this is to resort, in the manner of lawyers, to a process that does not
directly challenge the deeply opposed convictions.
The foregoing remarks are prelude to advice that good lawyers
and good law students do not wear their ideologies on their sleeves, do
not trumpet their deepest moral, philosophic, religious, political, and
economic convictions in the course of legal controversy as if the very
sound would cause the walls of Jericho to crumble. Putting these passionately-held convictions at the forefront of legal controversy does not
win over opponents or neutrals, it merely advertises your ideology, solidifies resistance, subjects your "rational" arguments to deprecation as
simply the expectable mouthings of an ideologue. You're in the wrong
profession: try preaching or political organizing or writing revolutionary tracts. Meanwhile, astute lawyers-who may be just as deeply
committed to your ideology-will be arguing your case with professional grace and plausibility, pitching the arguments on the firm
ground of commonly respected procedures and constitutional principles.
All this is not to suggest that you put aside passion and politics,
Id. at 25-26.
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but that you express them, on the professional side, in such a way that
other professionals, lawyers and judges, may decide in your favor without accepting or even seeming to accept your ideology. To develop this
facility, it is a good idea occasionally to put yourself in the frame of
mind of one of your ideological opponents, articulating in class discussion the "neutral principles" on the basis of which he might expect to
prevail. Such tactical identification with an opponent is an excellent
way to anticipate and effectively repel his thrusts, whether in legal
brief or war.
Role of the Defense Lawyer"6
The job of the defense attorney is to help the accused in every lawful
way before trial as well as during trial and on appeal. A person
charged with crime is in very serious trouble. He's got a lot going
against him. There's a big, professional detective force looking for evidence against him. The judge and the jury are inclined to believe, as
anybody would, that the accused is most likely guilty or else the police
wouldn't have arrested him, the magistrate wouldn't have held him, the
grand jury wouldn't have indicted, and the prosecuting attorney
wouldn't be pushing for conviction. Finally, the law is complicated.
Most people are scared by it and afraid they'll be tripped up.
The way we Americans look at it, a fellow caught in this situation
is entitled to one person who's on his side and knows the law-a defense lawyer. To begin with, the defense lawyer is supposed to investigate the case from the point of view of the client's innocence or mitigating circumstances. From experience, the lawyer knows what kind of
witnesses and testimony will be helpful to the defendant, and what kind
of checks should be made to expose weaknesses in the evidence of probable prosecution witnesses. This kind of investigation is often more important than the showy business in court, because it's the facts, more
than speeches, that influence judge and jury.
The defense attorney must be loyal to the client. The ethical rules
of the bar association, as well as the nature of the defense lawyer's job,
require that just about anything the client says to his lawyer is confidential, even confession of crimes. This is much like the protection
given to confessions made to priests. And the reason is the same: if the
sinner knew that his words would go abroad, many would not tell the
truth, and the purpose of confession would be defeated. So, if a client
" L. SCHWARTZ & S. GOLDSTEIN, LAW ENFORCEMENT HANDBOOK: THE POLICE AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 13-17 (2d ed. 1980).
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could not trust his lawyer completely, clients would often fail to tell
their lawyers important things which the lawyer should know, for example, in advising the client whether to plead guilty or not guilty.
Neither the lawyer nor the priest becomes involved in the guilts which
he hears confessed. Each has a job to do for the sinner or accused.
Because of loyalty to the client, the defense lawyer must often act
in a way that frustrates or irritates the police. For example, he or she
will usually tell the client not to answer police questions if there is any
possibility that the answers could be used against the client. The defense attorney will generally cross-examine police witnesses at the trial.

It is not the defense attorney's job to get the client off regardless of
how he does it. The defense attorney, like the prosecuting attorney, is
an "officer of the court[.]" Neither may knowingly deceive the court. If
either one got a witness to lie under oath, it would be contempt of court
and also the crime of suborning perjury. If a lawyer gets into the position of working as a partner in crime, for example, by advising
criminals how they can commit offenses without being caught, the lawyer would be guilty of criminal conspiracy. It's not a part of a defense
lawyer's job to help criminals commit crimes, and if you as a policeman
run into a lawyer who seems to be involved in that way, don't take it
that all defense lawyers act the same way. That's as untrue and unfair
to the great majority of honest defense lawyers as when unthinking
members of the public distrust all policemen because some go wrong.
It is often asked how a lawyer can defend somebody he or she
knows is guilty. The answer is easy when you understand the lawyer's
job in the administration of justice-a job assigned to the lawyer by
society, not just the client. It's not the lawyer's job to judge whether the
client is guilty or innocent; that's the job of judge and jury. Furthermore, the fact that the client says he's guilty doesn't necessarily mean
that it's so. Experienced lawyers and policemen are familiar with false
confessions of guilt. Sometimes such a confession is made to protect
someone else. Sometimes it is made by a person of low intelligence or
who is actually insane. . . . Sometimes uneducated defendants are
ready to admit guilt because they don't understand simple things about
the law. An uneducated man may think he is a murderer because he
killed someone even though it was a case of self-defense. A youth who
has had illicit intercourse with a woman may feel guilty, and may be
stupid enough not to know that it was rape only if he forced her.
Another reason for taking on the defense of a man who is believed
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to be guilty, is that "defending" doesn't necessarily mean trying to get
him off. It may mean advising him to plead guilty. If he pleads guilty,
or is found guilty after trial, one of the most important jobs of the
defense lawyer still remains to be done, namely, to show the court everything good that can possibly be said of the defendant so as to lighten
the sentence.
For these reasons, an experienced lawyer, retained or assigned to
defend a man on a criminal charge, would no more think of starting off
by asking if his client was guilty than would a surgeon operating on a
captured and wounded bank robber. In each case the professional is put
there to help the fellow. They need to have information bearing on the
defense or the medical situation. It's up to other people later to decide
whether the man is guilty and what to do about it if he is. The situation is something like that of the policeman making an arrest, who
often must say to himself, "Buddy, I'm not saying you did it or you
didn't do it. It looks as if you did it, and so my job is to take you in.
Other people will decide whether you're guilty."
An important part of the defense attorney's job is to keep the government on its toes and behaving according to the law. For example,
when the defense attorney objects to evidence obtained by illegal search,
he is of course seeking in the first place to save his client. But if he
keeps the evidence out of the case and so gets his man off, the police
will presumably be more careful after that to observe the rules regulating search.
A similar effect follows from every maneuver by defense counsel
that involves criticism of the government's case. Thus the defense lawyer may bring out that the law under which his client is accused is
unconstitutional, or that the grand jury was improperly constituted, or
that the indictment is defective, or that workingmen or Blacks or
women were discriminated against in jury selection. In a way, every
criminal trial thus becomes a trial also of the way the government conducts itself. Defense lawyers perform a valuable function here.
The defense lawyer has a job to do. It's a job as important to the
community as it is to the defendant. If persons accused of rape or treason were tried without defense lawyers, the newspapers and the public
would suspect that the trial was loaded against the defendant. There
would be less confidence in the verdict, in courts, and ultimately in
government. The defense lawyer's job is so important that our forefathers wrote it into the Constitution that the accused "shall enjoy the
right [to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence]."
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7

Stern, Lawyers on Trial, is an excellent book of its genre, which is
muckraking. I regard muckraking as socially useful as well as profitable to writers and publishers, and entertaining to readers. Stern is accurate in detail, perceptive, comprehensive, even stylish; and he certainly
succeeds in his goal of troubling lawyers about their profession. So
much so that I plan to make substantial use of the book in my Spring
course on the Legal Profession.
Where he fails is in diagnosing the social pathology and proffering
a remedy. He seems to think that matters would improve if only lawyers were more moral and refused to represent clients engaged in antisocial activities. But the problem is not immorality of lawyers. It lies
rather in the very texture of our competitive individualistic culture, a
culture riddled with defects and defensible only by comparison with the
visible alternatives. Moreover, the issue of social utility is rarely as
clear cut as Stern assumes.
If Stern's moral lawyer rejects a case or a client, there will be ten
other lawyers waiting in line to do the work. Stern is horrified by influential lawyers' private contacts with government decisionmakers. I deplore that as much as he does and government agencies have revised
their procedures to restrain the practice. But Stern ignores the other
branch of the problem: that in administrative agencies the "prosecutors" are colleagues of the decisionmakers in constant informal contact
with each other. Stern, like me, deplores the "revolving door" practice
by which lawyers recently resigned from an agency exploit their agency
contacts for the benefit of private clients; but he conveys no adequate
sense of the dilemma in trying to prevent that, as the law does, by
disqualifying recent employees from practice in the precise fields in
which they are expert. Stern notes but dismisses the lawyers' contention
that dilatory tactics are attributable primarily to the incompetence and
laxness of judges. The "unilateral disarmament" of one "moral" lawyer
cannot cure that problem. Observing that most of the culprits in the
Watergate scandal were lawyers, without stressing that the conspiracy
was brought down by other lawyers, is a misleading half-truth that
only serves to distract attention from the real problem of corruption.
All this is not a counsel of despair. I do my bit to raise the consciousness of my students with regard to the moral dilemmas of the
profession. Here and there a rule can be tightened, a new procedure
3' Letter from Louis B. Schwartz to Dori Lewis, Consultant for Editorial Development,
Times Books, New York, N.Y. (Oct. 6, 1980) (discussing P. STERN, LAWYERS ON TRIAL (1980)).
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invented to expedite justice. Maybe a book that harps on the moral
shortcomings of lawyers and their equivocal responses will help to
remold the conscience of society - provided someone is around to say
"Wait, fellows, the problem is not lawyers' morality." On reflection, I
think it unjustified to criticize Hazard's book, Ethics in the Practice of
Law, as "Non-Answers to Hard Questions," 89 Yale Law Journal
1438 (1980). Some questions too important to be ignored have no
"answers•"
Ironic Advice to Law Students on How To Pass Examinations 8
It is well known that law students almost unanimously desire to
pass examinations. Indeed, it may safely be assumed that many would
rather pass the examination than learn anything about the subject.
Some students have, in fact, passed without knowing anything about
the subject. No objective analysis of the examination process can overlook this fact. Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that ignorance is
helpful. To be sure, one ought not, in taking an examination, reveal
deeper insight or wider knowledge than the instructor, since natural
human jealousy is likely to warp his response. Barring such neurotic
reactions, however, one should assume that a little learning is a useful
thing. The following principles are offered for the guidance of those
who would like to pass, and who do not object seriously to a little
learning.
1.... Never mind suggestions that you read assignments in advance of class, discuss problems with your fellows, avoid hornbooks, etc.
All this reflects the professorial point of view-he has not been a student for years, and was probably atypical even in his undergraduate
days. Develop your own individuality.
2. Pace yourself. If you crowd all your studying in early in the
term, time will hang heavy later in the year just before the examination, dulling your perceptions. On the other hand, if you save your
strength at the beginning, and finish up with a burst of power, cramming twenty hours a day during the final weeks, your head will be full
of fresh, disorganized recollections as you enter the examination room,
giving you a maximum of material to draw from.
4. Plan to avoid all diversion or exercise during the last week
before exams. These are likely to promote relaxation and sound sleep.
Nobody ever passed an examination sleeping.
"
(1958).

Schwartz, How to Pass Law School Examinations, 11 J. LEGAL EDUC. 223, 223-25
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7. An elegant, inscrutable handwriting enlivens the professor's
day. Many a gay hour is spent in consultation with wife, child, or colleagues, or with cryptographic aides; and you may be sure that gratitude for this variation from the humdrum will be reflected in his grading. Fanciful and personal abbreviations can be combined with unusual
chirography to achieve sensational effects.
9. Avoid preoccupation with the precise words of the problem.
Start writing as soon as you get the general idea. This will allow you
time to exceed the page limit selfishly suggested by the professor. It will
also enable you to avoid any conscious guilt as you transcribe information you have memorized, having little bearing on the question asked.
10. The first of a series of problems is always the most important.
It should, therefore, be given at least twice as much time as the
problems that follow, regardless of suggested time allocations. If observance of this rule results in inadequate time for the final problem, this
can always be remedied by writing "TIME!" at the end of the paper.
12. If the problem calls for discussion from a particular point of
view, e.g., defense counsel, legislator, junior legal assistant, disregard
such limitations. The professor has probably forgotten about it, or
changed his mind. Besides, you will probably never be defense counsel
or legislator anyway.
13. The ability to supply missing facts necessary to your conclusion is highly regarded, and the more inventive you are, the higher the
regard. Some students manage to change the entire complexion of the
problem this way, and even to answer their own problem wrong.
15. Never forget that law is the expression of policy. So why not
go right to the heart of the matter at once. Give him policy. Show him
that your heart is in the right place. Intellect is not everything.
16. Overconcentration on the exact problem posed, in all its uniqueness of fact, may lead to answers undesirably tainted with practicality and common sense.
V.

REFLECTIONS

"Roman Baths" for City Slums 39
Did I ever discuss with you a certain pipe-dream of mine involv" Letter from Louis B. Schwartz to David A. Wallace, city planner (dated from Provence,
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ing architecture and city planning: the placing of a "Roman-bath-cultural-center" in the middle of three or four of Philadelphia's depressed
ethnic (and I don't mean just black) ghettos? I first got the idea admiring the magnificent swimming-pool-physical-culture facilities I have
seen in Cambridge England, Salzburg Austria, and here in Aix-en-Provence. Visiting the remains of old Roman baths in Provence, and reading about them in the Michelin guides, stimulated my imagination.
What I have in mind at the moment is the possibility that the idea
might be further developed using academic resources, e.g. a seminar or
graduate student research project. A philanthropic foundation might be
persuaded to subsidize this phase of study and elaboration. Eventually,
if the project developed favorably, such private financing might be
found for a full-scale pilot project. Let me record a few speculations on
features and problems of such an enterprise.
One starts with the physical: a splendid pool with a moving roof
that slides back in summer and is in any event transparent. One facade
is all glass, presenting the pool and its activities to the community.
There are separate ponds for learners, and a basking yard. Associated
with the pool, showers of course but also, perhaps, bathing facilities
designed not only as an alternative to inadequate hygiene in poor
homes, but avowedly as a physical luxury, an attractive place to relax
in groups. A gymnasium. Lo! a library, a game room, an exhibition
room for arts and crafts. Facilities for meetings of neighborhood organizations? Quarters for neighborhood medical and social services? The
goal is to create a genuine neighborhood centered on a cultural institution rather than a row of stores. The cultural institution bases itself on
the existing physical pre-occupations of the population to be served,
while exposing them to other influences.
The Riddle of the Germans'
[Arthur R.G.] Solmssen [author of A Princess in Berlin] gives us
the feverish post-World-War I Berlin of artists, writers, and idealistic
politicians; unemployed generals, grim ex-corporals, and mangled war
veterans; gay, desperate whores, and psychotic anti-semites. Here are
elegant fifth-generation converted Jews running investment banking
houses, newspaper chains and steamship lines, haunted by a secret
dread. Here is a Berlin of the pleasant suburban schloss, the liberated
upper class actress, and the nubile heiress whom one can teach sailing
Dec. 27, 1971).
'1 Schwartz, Book Review, U. PA. L. ALUMNI J., Winter 1981, at 17 (reviewing A. SOLMSSEN, A PRINCESS IN BERLIN (1980)).
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and other things.
Who can solve the riddle of the Germans? A people of extraordinary talent in science, industry, music, painting, literature, a people of
war, sentimentality, jingoism and genocide. Is it possible that the admired Germany of today could, like the Germany of Weimar, the
pleasant lands of pre-Bismark Germany, or the model of freedom, culture and politico-economic reforms that was the Germany of the late
19th Century, revert to the apocalyptic Beast? Our writers, and German writers as well, have lately been exploring the soul of this
portentous nation. Fritz Stern gave us a frightening reading in Gold
and Iron, a history of the tensions in Bismarckian Germany. Barbara
Tuchman has looked into this maelstrom in Proud Tower, The Guns
of August, and A Distant Mirror. Gunther Grass lifts the lid off this
same cauldron in The Tin Drum and The Flounder. There are, of
course, no answers to the riddle, but reflective people will be satisfied,
in reading The Princess, that they understand the question better.
On IneradicableDoubt, Martyrdom, and Myth"
On August 22, 1927, Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti were
executed by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. They had been convicted in 1921 of murdering one Berardelli in the course of an armed
robbery of a shoe company paymaster at South Braintree. The defendants were Italian immigrant anarchists. The era was that of Babbitry,
xenophobia, Harding-Coolidge "normalcy" and Attorney General
Palmer's raids against radicals. In the six year interval between trial
and execution, there gathered about Sacco and Vanzetti an extraordinary assembly of vindicators, including Felix Frankfurter, Walter
Lippmann, Dorothy Parker, Edna St. Vincent Millay, Arthur Schlesinger and John Dewey. Those of us who were arriving at the age of
political awareness in the summer of 1927 will not forget the tensions
of that frenzied final week of efforts to save two lives. Vibrations emanating from world-wide massive protest demonstrations electrified the
political atmosphere. I can still see the protesting poster in the shop
window of an Italian cobbler on the main street of our town.
Were they in fact guilty? The question seems almost irrelevant
four decades after their death. The continuingly relevant questions are:
Does our system of justice work as well as is humanly possible? Should
capital punishment be abolished in a regime of justice so long as there
41 Schwartz, Book Review, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 1260, 1260, 1264-65 (1966) (reviewing D.
FELIX, PROTEST: SACCO-VANZETMI AND THE INTELLECTUALS (1965)).
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is an irreducible margin of human error?
The theses of David Felix' book include the following propositions: The evidence was convincing of Sacco's guilt and persuasive of
Vanzetti's. They had a fair trial despite the fact that the trial judge,
Webster Thayer, was a political reactionary. The liberals of the
Twenties came (belatedly) to the support of these alien defendants because the liberals themselves felt alienated in the Harding-Coolidge society, and found identity in the role of protestants. The innocence of
Sacco and Vanzetti was elevated to the status of an article of faith, and
Vanzetti to the role of saint in a secular hagiography created by American writers of the Thirties.
Whether or not the "martyrdom" of Sacco and Vanzetti be
"myth," Felix' account of the reflection in art of these real, earth-shaking deaths is an absorbing and illuminating exercise on the borderlands
of politics, law, sociology and literary criticism. He takes up one by one
the novels and plays that wove themselves about the case and helped
build the myth. In the end, he acclaims the myth, regardless of its verity ....
Felix is a civilized man trying to understand. He takes us on a
difficult path between the thought-numbing certainties of the right and
left, but does not fall into action-numbing vacillation of the middle. He
sees the tragic necessity for decision despite dubiety, but action to which
he summons us would not be cruel, irrevocable or neurotically fixed
upon a single goal when humanity knows only plural goals.
42

Capital Punishment

Hegel's observation that history teaches nothing except that its lessons are ignored will not deter historians or reduce their audiences.
History, like philosophy, will be written and read regardless of any
crass utility, to satisfy man's inborn compulsion to find patterns in a
manifold universe. It thus serves as a branch of aesthetics, like music or
painting, distinguished from the novel or the play principally by the
requirement of verity in the detailed assertions employed to create the
total dramatic effect. To be sure, a history of criminal law will be
turned to practical account by life's brokers, in textbook and brief,
classroom and legislature-paintings are articles of commerce too-but
", Schwartz, Book Review, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 132, 132-34 (1949) (reviewing L. RADZI.
NOWIOZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION, 1750-1833 (1948))
(footnotes omitted).
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the essential virtue of Professor Radzinowicz' book is its power to arrest us with his brilliant evocation of an era in the moral development
of the western world.
For those who seek lessons in history many are here provided.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter has already cited Radzinowicz for the proposition that brutal methods of law enforcement are essentially self-defeating. Another might conclude from this history only that the excessively
severe penalties of the substantive criminal law led to an overly liberal
criminal procedure. Perhaps the lesson is that criminal laws must eventually conform to the moral sense of the community. Or is it more significant that Professor Radzinowicz documents a century of notable divergence between law and public opinion? Some may find in
Radzinowicz the thesis that nations can be converted and uplifted by
the heroic efforts of a few leaders, while others will adhere to Tolstoy's
view that heroes and leaders are mere instruments of their times, voicing rather than moulding the mass experience. There is material for
the reflection that each generation's reforms become the shackles of the
next generation. Long term imprisonment was introduced as a mitigation of capital punishment; solitary confinement was conceived as an
opportunity for moral regeneration through undisturbed meditation on
one's sins. The principle that punishment should be proportionate to
the crime was first used to persuade men to discriminate in penalty
between murder and malicious mischief; it then becomes an argument
against adapting treatment to the personality of the offender. We lack
the science of social cause and effect to tell us whether the amelioration
of eighteenth century English criminal law was cause, consequence, or
merely evidence of a more general softening or "civilization" which was
under way.
Criminal Law and Social Science: Tribute to a Great Coursebook"
Michael and Wechsler did not, of course, invent the "functional
approach," but they brought it to bear on a field of law that was-and
is-often assumed to be virtually an irrational response to vengeful impulses and unarguable premises. Their book [Criminal Law and Its
Administration] pervasively asks what our purposes are and whether
our means are well adapted to achieving those purposes. Since the purposes, premises, and norms of a society are complex and contradictory,
reflecting conflicting group interests, religious influences, perceptions
4'

Schwartz, The Wechslerian Revolution in CriminalLaw and Administration, 78 COLUM.

L. REV. 1159, 1160-61 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
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and misperceptions of sociology, psychology, philosophy, and medicine,
the book constantly confronts us with the premises of law, drawn from
these other disciplines, in a way that no other book had done. Ultimately the very image of the lawyer is transformed. Under Michael
and Wechsler's discipline, the lawyer can no longer remain a mere logician, grammarian, and instrument of a tyrannical sovereign will; he
becomes a humanist critic of the institutions that punish people whose
behavior departs egregiously from generally accepted norms.
The range over which this stunning synthesis extended required,
of course, radical innovation in expository method and style. The ponderous techique of reproducing numerous judicial opinions upon which
an inductive and "Socratic" pedagogy can be practiced had to be modified. Much information was conveyed in forthright summary, either in
the authors' own words or in quotations from commentators or legislative revisers. Typical statutes were reproduced, as deserving the same
intense examination and comparison as the utterances of judges. The
texts of Italian, Russian, and British legislation liberated us from parochialism. Problems of discretion were strikingly illustrated by sample
probation reports and by accounts by the Governor of New York and
the British Home Office regarding the exercise of executive clemency in
capital cases.
The book's tremendous intellectual demand was leavened by the
extraordinary dramatic flair evidenced in the selection of the case material. It is not hard to be interested in criminal law. Greed, lust, violence, treachery, political fanaticism, and madness are its raw materials.
But this book is particularly enthralling because the cases, like classical
tragedies, so frequently involve more than personal crises. With uncanny prescience of the great social and moral issues of the decades
ahead, the authors presented scenarios on racial conflict and unequal
justice, on youthful criminality, on middle-class reaction to aggression
from the ghetto, on organized crime, on white-collar crime, on euthanasia, on commercial arson with fatal consequences, on repression of political dissent, on culture conflict under imperialism, on bloody family
fights, and on lawlessness of law enforcement officers.
The Cultural Deficit in Broadcasting"'
American television has defaulted on its legal obligation to maintain the national cultural heritage, to diversify offerings from the point
of view of levels of taste, and to satisfy the demand of an important
"

Schwartz, The Cultural Deficit in Broadcasting,26 J. COM. 58, 63 (1976).
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segment of the audience that wants an effective alternative to lowestcommon-denominator programming to mass tastes by mass advertisers.
One may speak of a cultural deficit in this connection without, for the
time being, undertaking to define it. The concept of high culture does
not lend itself to comprehensive and precise definition. Like many unavoidably vague legal standards-due process of law, obscenity, reasonable grounds for arrest-it is only a rough guide by which judgments
can be made and remade from time to time.
The ingredients for judgment are not hard to name. The material
may be music, drama, painting, dance, architecture, history, biology,
astronomy, politics, religion, or philosophy-in short, anything in the
realm of the arts, the humanities, or science. It may be classical, but
not hackneyed, or innovative with some promise of entering into the
great flow of the history of thought and feeling. The material must be
such as cannot be appreciated without attention and even some educational preparation. In that respect it would differ not only from the
superficially distracting, easily accessible fare that presently dominates
the commercial TV screen, but also from most offerings on "educational" television, which quite properly has a large commitment to the
education of children, to current events, to cookery, to consumerism,
and to civic affairs.
The important thing is not legalistic definition of what constitutes
high culture, but providing credible appraisals of the broadcast system's
performance from the standpoint of culture .

. .

. To put it another

way, when a market is not-perhaps cannot be-effectively competitive, public regulation must be invoked to assure the flow and quality of
service that public interest requires.
Skepticism as to Administrative "Expertise"."Prescience of the
Liberal Turnabout on Judicial Review 4 5
Expertness has been oversold in this country. The obvious and
enormous success of specialization in industry and the physical sciences
has led to the notion that specialization holds the answer to all questions in politics, education, philosophy, and the social sciences generally. Also we live in the shadow of an indistinctly remembered era
prior to 1936 when the prestige of the judiciary had been undermined
by a series of decisions invalidating popular social legislation on dubious constitutional grounds. The great successes of the Roosevelt era
came to be associated in the minds of many with the rise of administra" Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of
Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARV. L. REV. 436, 471-73 (1954) (footnotes omitted).
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tive agencies. Only recently, while conservatives have been aligning
themselves with the regulatory bodies, has the liberal tune begun to
change. Now it is being recalled again that "war is much too serious a
matter to be entrusted to generals"-a jibe at expertness that finds serious expression in the American political principle of the dominance of
civilian over military power. A critic of the CAB has raised the question whether "five men can be found who are experts in political science, military science, the business of transportation, corporate finance,
and experts in legislation and the law." Speaking in another context,
Judge Wyzanski expresses the new skepticism of expertise with his
usual felicity: "one of the dangers of extraordinary experience is that
those who have it may fail into the grooves created by their own expertness. They refuse to believe that hurdles which they have learned
from experience are insurmountable can in fact be overcome by fresh,
independent minds."
We have only to look about at the social science experts and the
real role they play in community life to see that expertness is not wisdom and that the relative ordering of values in a society-the ultimate
problem of choosing between alternative courses of action-is something we do after the expert has completed his task of collecting data,
describing, and, to a limited extent, predicting. This should be sufficiently clear from the field of economics . . . . The most contradictory
policies are constantly buttressed by economic experts of unquestionable
authority ...
Administrative expertise is a slogan which served well in a period
of struggle to establish some degree of authority for the emerging new
tribunals. Perhaps the time has come for a reexamination of the content
of this slogan.
The Need for a Credible Left4
In view of the harsh things to be said about the scholarship, rhetoric, and politics of the Critical Legal Studies movement, I must affirm
at the outset the importance of addressing, not suppressing, the issues
that agonize these young radicals. The country and the world are
fraught with evil and injustice. Income and power are viciously
maldistributed. Hypocrisy and hysteria taint foreign and domestic policies. In this "age of communication," communications rot in substance
as the technology advances. The law does indeed embody, in part, the
will of the dominant to dominate. There is indeed a pervasive unjusti46 Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS-Land, 36 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1984).
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fled complacency. Radical measures may be required to turn us towards genuine human and social progress. There is then a continuing
need for a clamorous left to challenge establishment cliches. This need
has been, to an extent, filled by CLS, and the prospect of filling it
accounts for the attraction the movement holds over so many very able
people.
Even misdirected protest may sensitize those who will more soberly pursue reform, and will sharpen their perceptions. The danger,
however, is always that the status quo will only be solidified if the
attack upon it is manifestly vulnerable in logic and fact, or is perceived
as a game of jurisprudential polemics divorced from the real world and
devoid of practical proposals for progress. The need is for a credible
left, a left of impeccable scholarship and style. No doubt, many OLS
members, emerging from the nightmare of discovering evil, will turn to
the constructive tasks of reform.
7
Legal Aid Thirty Years Before Community Legal Services 4

[Professor Schwartz, temporarily assigned by the Securities and
Exchange Commission to the Seattle region in 1938, became active in
the local branch of the National Lawyer's Guild. He proposed that the
organization make legal aid its central activity.]
It seems to me necessary that the local chapter get something accomplished if it is to survive or be worth surviving. The Guild must be
more than a social club for people who think somewhat alike. The
problem of doing something precedes the problem of expanding membership and, in part, will solve the latter problem by making it possible
to point to achievement. An important step in the progression from
resoluting to action is confining attention to one or a few specific objectives. Such objectives may be akin to, but ought not to be identical with,
those of other "liberal" groups. Preferably, they should be within the
peculiar province of lawyers. If there are no such projects, the Guild
should dissolve to prevent dissipation of energies which might more effectively be employed by organizations which were in existence before
the Guild: The American Civil Liberties Union, The League for Peace
and Democracy, the Democratic Party, and the Friends of Spanish Democracy. In my opinion, however, there are aims which a lawyers'
guild is specially qualified to pursue. I suggest for immediate action the
following program which will enable the Seattle Chapter to do a public
service and at the same time help the profession of the law and lawyers.
4 Memorandum from Louis B. Schwartz to Chairman, Seattle Chapter, National Lawyer's
Guild (Aug. 20, 1938).
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[The memorandum here details a program for establishing a legal
aid operation, and continues with a discussion of related "institutional
advertising."]
What I have in mind here is a logical complement to the legal aid
program-an organized effort to advertise the need for and availability
of lawyers' services among those who can afford a moderate fee. Traditionally, lawyers have been barred from personal advertising, and partially, as a result of this attitude, lay institutions, particularly banks,
trust companies, insurance companies and title companies, have taken
over many of the lawyers' most profitable lines of activity. In addition,
there exists a large group of middle class people able to pay moderate
fees for legal counsel, but believing that a lawyer is to be consulted in
time of calamity and fearful, with or without basis, that preventive legal counsel is a luxury available only to racketeers and the rich.
One plan of attack on this problem might be that of the Junior
Bar Association of Buffalo, New York, which has given a series of radio skits, written and acted by members, dramatizing the need for lawyers' services. Usually the plays have been based on actual recent court
decisions. An alternative might be weekly broadcast or newspaper column discussing the effect of recent decisions in terms of real meaning to
the middle and lower classes. It is my impression that free time would
be available on some local station if the advertising element of the program were judiciously subtle. A permanent publicity committee would
seem to be the vehicle for studying and carrying out some such
program.
Civilizing the Law Review 4
What's wrong with the law reviews is an old topic. Reading the
old complaints and reflecting on new grievances lead me to the conclusion that the fundamental source of difficulty is loss of concern about
readers. The reviews are edited and published primarily to serve the
ends of the writers, not the readers. They afford students practice in
"legal" writing, professors an outlet for the "production" which is a
professional necessity, polemicists a platform however lowly. It is not
surprising that frequently the style is pedantic, the documentation
grossly excessive, the choice of subject matter idiosyncratic, the selection
of comments virtually dictated by the accident of which student's writeup is superior and available at deadline time.
This is not to say that law reviews serve no function. In the aggre48 Schwartz,
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gate, the reviews constitute a valuable (if vastly expensive) mine or
bank of information, ready-made research, and rhetoric. But no one
would buy or read one law review for this purpose. Rather, we have
libraries to stock them all, and the Index To Legal Periodicalsto help
us search the whole canon when we want help with a specific problem.
The rise of the specialist legal journal has further diluted the significance of any one university law review. The tax practitioner, the antitrust specialist, the criminal lawyer, the lawyer who concentrates on
municipal government, patents, banking, or insurance, certainly doesn't
read a university law review to keep up professionally.
Is the university law review then a moribund institution? Is it to
be bought only out of old-school-tie loyalty (or compulsion, where the
law student has its cost billed to him with the tuition fee)? Does it and
will it survive (8 issues a year? 6? quarterly?) only because law schools
must subsidize it as a teaching aid or for "prestige" purposes?
The answer to these questions may be yes. But there is another
possibility waiting to be realized by daring ventures in new editorial
policy. The crux of that new policy would be a more explicit catering
to reader interest, with definite classes of readers and potential readers
in mind. The readers I envision are cultivated, literate lawyers with
broad interests, and also educated laymen who can follow a discourse
on legal matters with a minimum of incidental explanation. Law students fall into the latter category. A review so edited would not have to
be forced upon students by mandatory subscriptions, or by threats that
examination questions will be answerable only from that source, or by
desperate appeal for "support." Such a review would instead constitute
an introduction to the heady, witty, vital, precise, and far-ranging intercourse of good lawyers when they foregather to talk of justice and
society. The new Law Review would have the same relationship to law
that the Scientific American has to current science. It would be literature as well a law.
Coerced Confessions: A Twelve-Year-Old Murder Conviction
Annulled
In habeas corpus proceedings in the Sheeler case,"' Professor
Schwartz and Raymond J. Bradley unraveled a fantastic story of miscarriage of justice. Sheeler spent twelve years in prison under a life
sentence imposed for murder of a policeman. The judgment was en" Commonwealth ex rel. Sheeler v. Burke, 367 Pa. 152, 79 A.2d 654 (1951) (findings of
Levinthal, J., reported at 74 Pa. D. & C. 241 (1951)). For a discussion of this case, see J. FRANK
& B. FRANK, NOT GUILTY 168-80 (1957).
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tered following his plea of guilty in open court, on the advice of two
lawyers who had been appointed by the court to defend him in this
capital case. Sheeler had been brutalized and terrorized by Philadelphia
police during a week of illegal detention until he signed a long, policefabricated confession. So convinced had he become that the police
would send him to the electric chair if he recanted the confession and
that they could save his life if he "cooperated," that he publicly embraced the prosecutor in open court when the "lenient" life sentence
was pronounced.
Over the years various lawyers had been enlisted on Sheeler's behalf, but they lost on a motion for a new trial on the ground of after
discovered evidence (for example, an employer's record showing that
Sheeler was working in New York City at the time of the shooting).
Professor Schwartz was brought into the case by Philadelphia's famous
Judge Curtis Bok, who had befriended Sheeler in the course of prison
visits. A year's investigation followed, after which application was made
directly to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to exercise its extraordinary original jurisdiction in habeas corpus. The writ issued, designating a widely-respected trial judge to hear the case as referee. The sensational trial before Judge Levinthal lasted almost a week, was front
page news throughout, and was regularly attended by Professor
Schwartz' students in criminal law.
In the course of the trial, the "confession" was torn to shreds. It
was shown, for example, that Sheeler, pressed by the police to designate a meetingplace where he was supposed to have rendezvoused with
accomplices, gave an address with which he was familiar, and that was
incorporated in the confession. The house at that address had been torn
down two years earlier. Similarly, to tie in with the story of a police
stool-pigeon that Sheeler had fled from Philadelphia to "West New
York" on the night of the murder, Sheeler incorporated in his confession an address on the west side of Manhattan. Neither he nor his
interrogators were aware that "West New York" is a town in New
Jersey.
It was also proved that Sheeler had originally denied his guilt, had
employed his own defense lawyer, who had been summarily edged out
of the case to be replaced by compliant court-appointed "defense" lawyers, and had confessed only after prolonged detention, beatings, midnight interrogation, and confrontation with bogus eye-witnesses.
The Supreme Court granted habeas corpus, and in a swift retrial
(the Philadelphia District Attorney's office still resisting), Sheeler was
acquitted.
The Law Review asked Professor Schwartz to record his reflec-
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tions on this extraordinary case. They follow:
Four things stay with me as a result of this experience: (1) an
appreciation of the common humanity shared by us on the outside with
those in prison; (2) a still-amazed awareness of the depth of corruption
that can penetrate a community in the name of law enforcement; (3)
the subversive effect of such occasional gross injustices upon respect for
"the system," notwithstanding that the overwhelming majority of the
incarcerated are in fact guilty; and (4) the psychic rewards available to
young lawyers willing to immerse themselves in the battle against
injustice.
As to our common humanity with the jailed, there was Sheeler,
who had had a very seamy childhood after emerging from an orphanage at the age of sixteen in the depths of the Great Depression. A kind
fellow-prisoner had guided his reading in prison to the point where he
was a remarkably sophisticated young man when he emerged from
prison. I met his prisonmates, men who had been convicted of terrible
crimes but who were like the rest of us: capable of loyalty and consideration but also of treachery and cruelty; some very intelligent, more stupid; many likable, some dour and repulsive; crazy and sane and all
degrees between: people we have to punish but must not hate.
As to corruption (I speak now of the Philadelphia before the great
post-World War II reform of the Clark-Dilworth era), what is one to
think of a community where a notorious squad of policemen hunted
down "gangsters," especially supposed police-killers, disposing of them
by shooting "in self-defense" in the course of arrest. What is one to
think of a leading newspaper which honored such heroes of law enforcement? How regard as anything but a nightmare the course of
events leading to the framing of Sheeler? Someone else, in all
probability the real killer, had been convicted, likewise on a confession,
and had been in prison a year before the police took after Sheeler. He
was released upon Sheeler's conviction! What were the police motives?
I never learned reliably, but the most plausible explanation was a
schism in the police department: one faction had "solved" the policeman's murder with the earlier conviction. Another faction sought to discredit the first faction and its solution.
Criminal justice is an essential but vulnerable institution, perhaps
dirty business at best. It does not deserve the mortal blows of the great
unjust convictions. I feel an urge to remind people how atypical the
Sheeler case is. Sheeler himself came out of prison vowing to secure the
release of all those fellow-prisoners who were also unjustly convicted.
He declined most of my proposals to reintegrate him into ordinary civilian life, and spent a year running down evidence for his former cell-
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mates. Then he gave me a stunned report: "You know what? They
were all lying!"
The supply of injustice, large and small, has not run low. They
may not all be Sheeler cases, or even criminal cases-or cases of any
kind, but rather statutes and institutions that conduce to heart-breaking
family crises; to demoralizing discrimination; to oppression in mine,
factory, hospital, or army; to vast unpunishable economic exploitation.
To lawyers bogged down in narrow client-serving, I'd like to say, "Pick
a cause and run with it. It's almost indecently enjoyable."

